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I. Introduction
How do we define executive power in the Constitution of the
United States? Throughout our history, this question has been
hotly contested, including among the framers themselves. At
the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, George Mason thought
that the executive branch should be headed by a council of three,
with one member from the northern, middle, and southern
states respectively.1 Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand,
argued that the best safeguard for liberty and security would be
an elected monarch with life tenure.2 Less than a decade later,
Alexander Hamilton once again found himself in a dispute over
the scope of the executive power, this time with fellow framer
James Madison, who argued that President Washington’s
Neutrality Proclamation was an unconstitutional usurpation of
Congress’ power to declare war.3 Alexander Hamilton disagreed,
1. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES 23 (Ralph Ketcham ed. 1986) (“If the [e]xecutive is vested in three
[p]ersons, one chosen from the northern, one from the middle, and one from
the [s]outhern [s]tates, will it not contribute to quiet the [m]inds of the [p]eople,
[and] convince them that there will be proper attention paid to their respective
[c]oncerns?”).
2. Id. at 54–55 (“As to the [e]xecutive . . . [t]he [e]nglish model was the
only good one on this subject. The [h]ereditary interest of the King was so
interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that
he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad, and at the
same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controled [sic], to
answer the purpose of the institution at home. . . . Let the [e]xecutive also be
for life.”).
3. NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON 375–84 (2017).
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arguing that because the power was neither legislative nor
judicial, it was executive under the Constitution.4 Given that
two of the framers disagreed so strongly on the meaning of
“executive power” in the text of the Constitution that they helped
write only six years earlier, we can safely assume that the
Constitution leaves much of the executive power to be
determined in political fights and decisions over time.
In the first clause of Article II of our Constitution, the
framers wrote that the “executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”5 This opening line
settled a key debate between the framers at the convention:
whether to have an executive council or a single unitary
executive, with the latter winning.6 However, while the
Constitution settles this debate over a singular or plural
executive, it does not specifically define executive power. It does,
however, enumerate powers and duties in Sections Two and
Three.7 These powers and duties are undeniably vested in the
president, and thus we owe it to the text to examine their scope
and implications for any broader executive power advocated by
some scholars.
This article is focused on the Opinions Clause, which
empowers the president to “require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”8
The Opinions Clause is the only power set forth in Article II that
speaks to the president’s role in the day-to-day administration
of the civilian government.9 Clearly, it assumes a president that
is at the top of the executive branch hierarchy with respect to
the flow of information.10 The president may demand opinions
4. Id. at 377.
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
6. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (outlining the
disagreements).
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3.
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
9. Of course, modern unitary scholars will argue that the Vesting Clause
and the Take Care Clause speak to the president’s day-to-day role in the
administration to an even greater degree than the Opinions Clause. However,
as this article explains, those clauses leave great ambiguity in the exact powers
of the Presidency, while the Opinions Clause is undeniably clear and specific.
10. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion
Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647 (1996).
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on any subject related to the duties of the particular executive
agency, meaning that there is nothing within the executive
branch that he cannot discover. Professor Akhil Amar wrote
that the clause yields “rich insights into the scope, limits, and
nature of the American Presidency, with implications both
timely and timeless.”11 Amar’s statement has never been
timelier, and we should answer the call to examine in greater
detail those important implications.
Given Alexander Hamilton’s position on an elected
monarch, it is perhaps not surprising that he called the clause a
“mere redundancy.”12 Many unitary scholars, or those who
believe in a strong and broad substantive reading of the Vesting
Clause, agree.13 Contrary to Alexander Hamilton’s view,
however, the Opinions Clause is in no way redundant. It serves
an important purpose for the presidency and our constitutional
structure as a whole. Although it is a limited power that implies
further limits on the broader executive power, it is not a power
to be dismissed. In fact, the Clause vests the president with the
authority to access any and all information within the duties of
the federal government. What the president can do with this
information depends on what laws congress has passed and,
perhaps more importantly, the political skill of the particular
president.
If, for example, congress delegated broad
unrestricted authority to the president over a particular
statutory framework, then the president can use the Opinions
Power to become more informed of the proposed actions of his
officers, and then correct any actions he wishes.14 However, the
Opinions Clause is limited by what it does not say: it does not
give the president an absolute power to issue orders, to fire
officers, or, as is important in the modern debates on

11. Id. at 647.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
13. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102
YALE L. J. 991, 1004 (1993); see also Amar, supra note 10, at 648–49 (arguing
that it is acceptable to have constitutional redundancies and, thus, we should
not seek a meaning for the sake of meaning).
14. Here, the President may take any corrective action because Congress
has delegated unrestricted authority to the President. As this article will show,
the Opinions Clause allows Congress to place certain restrictions on what
corrective actions the President may take. See infra Part III(B),
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presidential overreach into the FBI, to demand direct
communications with inferior officers.15 Thus, the Opinions
Clause represents a compromise by the framers: the nuts and
bolts of the executive power will shift based on the political
battles of the day—just as we saw in the dispute between
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison over the
constitutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation—but the one
constant embodied in the Opinions Clause is the president’s
authority to arm himself with information.16
This article will analyze the Clause’s text, its history and
intent, and its potential functions as a power. Part II catalogues
much of the prior scholarship on the Opinions Clause, which
generally fits into two categories: the anti-unitary approach,
which argues that a substantive reading of the Vesting Clause
renders the Opinions Clause redundant,17 and the unitary
response, which essentially accepts that redundancy.18 To some
extent, both sides miss the mark. The unitary approach
misreads the text, assigning great substantive weight to the
descriptive Vesting Clause, while assigning descriptive status to
the substantive Opinions Clause. The anti-unitary approach, on
the other hand, neglects to analyze the substantive powers of the
Opinions Clause and what they mean for the constitutional
nature of the presidency. As a result, while anti-unitary

15. Cf. Amar, supra note 10, at 667 (arguing that the power over principal
officers contains the power over the inferior officers).
16. The same argument applies to the Decision of 1789, in which the First
Congress voted to grant the President the power of removal. Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 642–62 (1994) (discussing the disagreements in Congress
on the merits, the need, and the decision to grant the President with removal
authority). This decision was a political decision made by Congress that can be
reversed by a future Congress. To some extent, the debate itself answers the
question of whether the Constitution solved the removal problem.
17. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–38, 72 (1994); see also Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1795–98 (1996);
Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 689 (1989) (stating “[a]
broad reading of the Take Care Clause would have the effect of reducing the
Opinions Clause . . . to surplusage”).
18. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12; Amar, supra note 10, at 648–49.
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scholars are correct in that the Opinions Clause refutes a
substantive reading of the Vesting Clause, their position is
undermined by their failure to advocate for a definable
alternative. This article fills this space.
Part III focuses on the text of the Opinions Clause and
analyzes its implications for the Presidency. The text vests the
president with discretionary power to inform himself of the
workings of the entire executive branch. On the other hand, the
limited nature of this power suggests that the Constitution does
not vest the president with unenumerated powers. For example,
the Opinions Clause grants the president the authority to
require a principal officer report to him, but it does not grant the
president the power to remove that officer. To close this
argument, the Opinions Clause and the broader structure of
Article II is used to refute the unitary argument that the Vesting
Clause fills in any of the gaps in power left by the Opinions
Clause.
Part IV assigns the Clause its historical significance by
analyzing its introduction and adoption at the Philadelphia
Convention. Then, it is shown that the Clause serves James
Madison’s and the framers’ purpose of the presidency: to be a
republican check on a factious legislature. To illustrate, Part V
analyzes President Washington’s use of the Opinions Clause to
prepare and execute a response to the Whiskey Rebellion. From
this historical example, an inference is made of three Opinions
Clause powers vested uniquely in the president: the Unitary
Political and Legislative Power, the Unitary Judicial Power, and
the Unitary Executive Power. These three powers enable the
president to protect the executive branch from both legislative
and judicial encroachments, garner political support amongst
the electorate, and unify the executive branch even in situations
where congress has restricted the president’s legal authority.
Finally, Part VI examines the recent practices of President
Trump through the lens of the Opinions Clause, namely,
President Trump’s attempt to use the Opinions Clause for his
initial justification for the firing of former FBI Director James
Comey. This Part includes the discovery of potentially troubling
facts centered around the current President’s actions which tend
to compromise the independence of the Department of Justice.
In contrast to President Washington, who used the power of the
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Opinions Clause to further his legislative, judicial, and executive
policies in crushing the Whiskey Rebellion, President Trump’s
actions suggest a reason the framers granted the president this
more limited power—to allow Congress the flexibility to regulate
the execution of the law and prevent presidential abuse of power.
Additionally, after documenting the evidence as we now know it,
this Section turns to the steps congress can take on the basis of
the correct reading of Article II. Congress can insulate inferior
officers such as the FBI Director from reporting directly to the
president, prevent presidents from ordering politically
motivated investigations, and protect any officer, including
Special Counsel Robert Mueller, from at-will removal.
Generally speaking, this article analyzes an often-ignored
clause in our Constitution and finds a significant power grant.
In so doing, the wisdom of the Opinions Clause emerges. It is a
great power, but it is limited, and its limitations grant us and
our representatives the flexibility to strike the right balance
between preserving presidential power and enabling congress’
power to ensure fair and independent law enforcement.
II. Previous Scholarship on the Opinions Clause
Although there is little scholarship that focuses solely on the
Opinions Clause,19 scholars have used the Clause as a pawn in
the broader arguments over executive power. This broader
debate generally centers around what it means to have a unitary
executive. The key textual hook for the unitary executive theory
is Article II’s Vesting Clause: “the executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.”20 On one
side, proponents of a strong Unitary Executive believe that this
Vesting Clause grants all federal executive powers to the
19. The only other article focused solely on the Opinions Clause is Akhil
Amar’s work, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause. See generally Amar,
supra note 10. Amar usefully breaks down the text of the clause and assigns
certain principles to each of its key phrases. Id. at 661–62. For instance, the
word “respective” presents a hub and spoke model for the President and the
executive branch. Id. The word contemplates many different spokes, or
principal officers responsible for their one executive department, with the
President serving as the hub responsible to the American people for the whole
branch. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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president alone, unless otherwise restricted by the
Constitution.21 The anti-unitary scholars, on the other hand,
believe that the Vesting Clause is a naming clause—settling the
debate that there will be one president—rather than granting
any substantive powers. A naming function allows congress to
create agencies independent of the president’s will; for example,
removal restrictions.22 Within this broader debate, the Opinions
Clause is generally first cited by anti-unitary scholars as
evidence that the Vesting Clause is not a substantive power
grant, with the unitary scholars limiting their analysis of the
clause to rebuttal of this argument.
A. The Anti-Unitary Approach
The anti-unitary scholars use the presence of the Opinions
Clause to negate any substantive meaning in the Vesting
Clause. If the Vesting Clause actually granted all executive
power in the president (as the unitary scholars argue), there
would be no need to enumerate the powers later listed in Article
21. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power
Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994).
22. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 9; see also Steven G. Calabresi
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (explaining how, as a result of
the lack of debate, the Constitution does not vest the power in any one body,
and thus the authority must either come from the Vesting Clause, the Take
Care Clause, the Appointments Clause, or perhaps even the Necessary and
Proper Clause). Alternatively, the power may come from a law passed by
Congress and signed by the President. Id. To illustrate the power’s
importance, Professors Calabresi and Rhodes, unitary executive theorists, list
the removal power with one of the three executive powers that must be vested
in the President through the Vesting Clause Id.; see also Michael W.
McConnell, The Logical Structure of Article Two 67 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Buffalo Law Review), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/colloquium/constitutionallaw/documents/2016_Fall_McConnell_Art.pd
f (explaining that limitations on the President’s constitutionally guaranteed
executive power have many implications for the function of our government).
The removal power is the most commonly cited power in these debates
precisely because we’ve come to believe that ultimate accountability lies with
removal from office. Id. Thus, from the first Congress, to the Andrew Johnson
impeachment proceedings, up to the modern-day dispute over the independent
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the President’s right to remove
officers has been hotly contested. Id. It’s a striking mystery, as Professor
McConnell has pointed out, that the framers at the convention did not speak
clearly to which branch would be vested with the Removal power. Id.
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II, including the Opinions Clause. The Opinions Clause is
noteworthy because it is such a seemingly strange power to be
singled out in writing when most readers would assume it to be
encompassed by executive power.23 Indeed, it seems obvious.
Professors Sunstein and Lessig, in The President and The
Administration, build on this argument by pointing to the
history of the Clause at the convention, which originally
included the chief justice alongside executive officers as subject
to this power.24 The chief justice was ultimately removed from
the Clause, thus leaving the president without the Opinions
Power over the chief justice.25 From this, Sunstein and Lessig
deduce that the Opinions Clause is necessary as a power grant,
thus negating a substantive Vesting Clause.26 Underlying this
argument is the interpretative canon that redundant readings,
particularly of constitutional clauses, should be avoided. Antiunitary scholars have thus cautioned against overly broad
readings of both the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause
that render the Opinions Clause (and the other power-grants in
Article II, Section Two) surplusage.27
Still, the anti-unitary argument contains a trace of a unitary
executive theory: the Opinions Power is vested in the president
alone and cannot be restricted by congress. Professors Sunstein
and Lessig, in their conservative reading,28 state that the
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12 (considering it “a mere
redundancy” that comes with the office).
24. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 33–34.
25. While this seems clear, President Washington requested the opinion
of Chief Justice John Jay, who cited the Opinions Clause and the removal of
the Chief Justice from it as reason that he could not offer his opinion to the
President. Letter from John Jay et al., Supreme Court Justices, Supreme
Court of the U.S., to George Washington, U.S. President (August 8, 1793),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0263.
26. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 34; see also Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 16, at 627. Professors Calabresi and Prakash reject this analog; of
course the executive power in the Vesting Clause does not cover the Chief
Justice who is in a coequal branch of government, but we should not infer from
this natural and constitutionally-mandated assumption that the President
then also needs the Opinions Clause to have substantive power over executive
officers.
27. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 689; see also Peter M. Shane, The
Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 323, 343–44
(2016); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1142–43 (2014).
28. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 32–38. (offering two readings
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Opinions Clause at least serves as the line that congress cannot
cross (as opposed to other lines congress may cross such as, say,
restricting presidential power to fire the officer).29 In this sense,
they argue that the Opinions Clause establishes a unitary
administration with one line of executive officials who are all
responsible to the president through the Opinions Power.30
Professors Sunstein and Strauss classify the power as
procedural, allowing a president to establish a coherent
regulatory agenda, even if other substantive powers are
limited.31 Professor Strauss subsequently compares the clause
to the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which clearly establishes a
direct and affirmative presidential power. The Opinions Clause,
by contrast, provides for officers with duties, suggesting that the
president will play a more passive and managerial role over the

of the Opinions Clause: the conservative and the radical). While the
conservative reading is described above and built upon in this article, the
radical reading construes the Opinions Clause together with the Inferior
Officer Appointments Clause to establish a fourth branch beyond the
President’s reach. Id. The Opinions Clause refers to “Principal Officers” while
the Inferior Officer’s Clause refers to the heads of departments. Id. These two
terms imply two separate officers, and thus the heads of departments are part
of some headless fourth branch not subject to the president’s Opinions Power.
Id. Both anti-unitary and unitary scholars alike have rejected this argument,
it is doubted that the framers intended an entire branch of government to be
implied by the difference between two terms, particularly because Articles I,
II, and III lay out a strong structural assumption that there will only be three
branches. Id.; see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984)
(attributing the different terms to unsophisticated drafting on behalf of the
framers).
29. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 34.
30. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
31. Cass R. Sunstein & Peter L. Strauss, The Role of the President and
OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 200 (1986); see also
Strauss, supra note 28, at 574. In this second article, Professor Strauss traces
the Opinions Power thread through the modern era of presidents beginning
with President Kennedy, and then picking up force with Presidents Carter,
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, who each utilized the Opinions Power by
establishing the Office of Management and Budget and then requiring that
each agency report proposed regulations through it. Strauss, supra note 28, at
574. Strauss comments that the Clause suggests that the information could
be received prior to the action being taken, even if the president may be
powerless to stop an independent agency from taking such an action. Id.
Nevertheless, the president must be able to know that the action is coming.
Id. Part III will expand on the Opinions Clause and its unitary function with
respect to independent agencies.
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civilian administration.32
In sum, while the anti-unitary scholars argue that the
Opinions Clause establishes a line congress cannot cross, they
maintain that its existence in the Constitution negates a
substantive reading of the Vesting Clause.
B. The Unitary Response
In response, unitary scholars first assert that it is okay for
the Opinions Clause to be redundant. Professor Amar cautions
against inventing meanings for the sake of avoiding redundancy,
citing the entire Bill of Rights as potentially redundant.33 In
fact, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 74 called the clause
a “mere redundancy.”34 Unitary scholars further insist that the
Clause’s redundancy does not suggest that it serves no purpose.
Professors Calabresi and Prakash argue that the Clause is a
truism emphasizing the Vesting Clause’s hierarchy.35 Perhaps
most importantly, they argue that the Clause served a historical
purpose at the Convention, easing the harmful effects of a
unitary executive to those in favor of an executive council. The
Clause aimed at alleviating fears that a single president would
lack advice, an impetus for a clause that ensured the president
would have a cabinet.36
In Hail to the Chief Administrator, Prakash further argues
that the historical context of the Clause’s proposal and debate at
the Convention indicates the Vesting Clause confers all
executive power to the president.37 As he and Calabresi
32. See generally Peter L. Strauss, A Softer Formalism, 124 HARV. L. REV.
F. 55, 59 (2011).
33. Amar, supra note 10, at 648–49; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 16, at 585 (pointing to the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional
redundancy).
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 12.
35. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 585; see also Amar, supra note
10, at 651 (arguing that the Clause serves to “clarify and exemplify”).
36. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 629, n.393. (“Ellsworth,
writing as The Landholder, pointed to the Opinions Clause to assuage the fears
of those who felt that the President would be bereft of advice”).
37. Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005 (stating “the Framers arguably
included this provision to facilitate presidential control of discretion. The
President may demand opinions in order to determine how he should execute
federal law.”) (emphasis in original).
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highlight, the Clause was introduced by Gouverneur Morris and
Charles Pinckney—two framers strongly in support of a unitary
executive—leaving them to doubt any reading of the clause that
interprets it as a limit instead of a truism restating the power
granted in the Vesting Clause.38 In addition to language closely
resembling the Opinions Clause,39 the original proposal provided
for a council of state who would “assist the President” in his final
decision-making responsibility, suggesting to Prakash an
expansive view of presidential power.40 Although the Committee
of Eleven deleted the provisions Prakash cites here, he argues
that the finalized text of the Opinions Clause mirrors the
original proposal, and thus we should not read it as divorced
from Morris and Pinckney’s original intent.41
38. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 630–31.
39. Prakash, supra note 13, at 1006, n.107 (pointing out similarities
between the original proposal, which stated “he may require the written
opinions of any one or more of the . . . members . . . . and every officer
abovementioned shall be responsible for his opinion on the affairs relating to
his particular Department” and the language which states “he may require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices”).
40. Id. (explaining that, under the original proposal, the president would
be the chief administrator with the authority to command all of the executive
department heads).
41. Id.; see infra notes 115–36 and accompanying text for an
interpretation of this history. While it is true that the Opinions Clause mirrors
one phrase in the original proposal, see Prakash, supra note 13, Prakash
argues that because one portion of the Clause is the same, we should attach
the meaning of the other original portions, such as cabinet members serving
“at the pleasure of the president,” even though these parts were removed.
However, they were removed for a reason. Prakash argues that the context
explains their removal and the other provisions were removed because the
framers were afraid that providing for a council in the Constitution would
allow the president to escape accountability, hence the removal of “Council of
State” from the Clause. Id. To support this argument, he cites the
simultaneous motion by George Mason for a plural executive, which was
rejected by the same Committee of Eleven that revised the Opinions Clause.
Id., at 1006. The revisions were about preserving presidential accountability,
according to Prakash, further supported by James Iredell’s statements at the
North Carolina ratifying convention: essentially that the Opinions Clause
maintains that it is the President who is accountable for the executive branch,
not a Council of State. Id.
This argument might explain why the framers removed the Council of State
provision from the original proposal, but it fails to explain why they removed
provisions like assist the president, serve at the pleasure of the president, or
that the president’s decision was final. Each of these three proposals seems to
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All in all, the unitary scholars argue that the Opinions
Clause is largely redundant, restating the truism already found
in the Vesting Clause. Almost as an afterthought, they state
that the Clause could plausibly foreclose the president from
exercising the King’s prerogative to have his officers tend to his
personal affairs.42 But otherwise, they disregard the limits on
constitutional executive power that the Opinions Clause
embodies.
C. Finding the Clause’s True Meaning
To a certain extent, both camps miss the true implications
of the Opinions Clause for presidential power. The unitary
scholars misread the text of Article II. They assign substantive
powers to the Vesting Clause and prefer to read the far more
limited Opinions Clause as a redundancy or a restated truism.
However, this argument strains credulity. Although some
readers may find the Opinions Clause a strange presidential
power to single out in the Constitution, it is an even stranger
truism to repeat just for emphasis. Assuming a substantive
Vesting Clause, why would the framers choose to reiterate the
power to require opinions from only principal officers and not the
power to fire anybody at will or the power to issue directives?
Surely, the latter two hypothetical redundancies would better
support the unitary scholars’ vision of the Constitution.
There is a far more plausible explanation that is more in line
with the structure of Article II. The Vesting Clause solves the

uphold presidential accountability, so why would it make sense for the framers
to strike them in the name of accountability? Perhaps replacing “Council of
State” with “principal officers” is significant for the reason Prakash states
(though perhaps not). However, if the framers truly wanted to preserve
accountability, they would have said he may require the opinion, in writing, of
the principal officers, who shall assist and serve at the pleasure of the president,
and the president’s decision shall be final.” However, they did not say this, and
not because it did not occur to them; similar language was in Morris and
Pinckney’s original proposal. See infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
The framers actually decided against including these strong powers.
42. Amar, supra note 10, at 654 (describing how the framers included
“duties of their . . . offices” to suggest that the president lacked the King’s
authority to have a privy council tend to his personal affairs); Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 16, at 584–85.
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key historical question whether there should be one president.43
It is located in Section One, which we will call the Naming
Section because it is surrounded by clauses that name the office
and its characteristics.44 This context implies a non-substantive
and naming Vesting Clause, not an all-encompassing power
grant. The Opinions Clause, by contrast, is located in Section
Two, surrounded by the president’s other constitutional powers.
The Opinions Clause not only refutes a substantive reading of
the Vesting Clause, but it also becomes the very important
substantive power grant detailed in this article.
On the other hand, while the anti-unitary approach
correctly identifies a non-substantive Vesting Clause, it fails to
acknowledge the significance of the Opinions Clause aside from
its worth in defeating any substantive reading of the Vesting
Clause. Yes, the Opinions Clause’s mere existence undermines
the notion that the Vesting Clause grants any substantive
executive powers, but this is not a strong enough argument to
fully refute the unitary scholars’ approach. Any reading of
Article II that is based in part on the existence of the Opinions
Clause needs to define the powers that the Clause actually vests
in the president, not just describe what powers the Clause leaves
out.
In Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, Professor Amar
admirably offered several plausible interpretations of the
Clause. This textual analysis is built upon in Part III, infra.
But, in some sense, the text does not tell the complete story.
While the text strongly favors the substantive Opinions Clause
reading, one needs to engage the unitary scholars on the original
republican intent of the Presidency and how the Opinions
Clause furthers that intent. This is accomplished in Part IV,

43. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the framers’ concern over having
one President or a plural executive council.
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This article refers to Section One as the
naming section because it identifies who will be vested with executive power
(the president); the term of his office; the vice president; the manner for his
election including naming the electors; the citizenship, age and residency
requirements; the removal process (since amended by the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment); and the president’s compensation. Section One closes with the
oath of office, naming the moment when the citizen assumes the office of
president and possesses the powers and duties subsequently vested by Section
Two (“powers”) and Section Three (“duties”). Id.
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infra. The analysis also needs to answer legitimate concerns
about a more limited presidential power in practice, including,
for instance, that executive branch accountability will suffer
from a restricted removal power. Part V, infra, analyzes how
the Opinions Clause serves the president’s interests in these
concerns and may even be better for the president than the
“Damocles’ sword of removal.”45 Finally, analysis of the
substantive Opinions Clause invites an example of the flexibility
and safeguards it empowers us to design. This constitutional
flexibility is illustrated in Part VI, infra, rejecting the notion
that congress is powerless to prevent presidential overreach
with the FBI.
III. The Textual Opinions Clause: Its Powers
and its Limitations
A proper analysis of the Opinions Clause should begin with
its text and its place in the overall structure of Article II. The
first three sections of Article II divide into three distinct
categories: the Naming Section One, the Powers Section Two,
and the Duties Section Three. Each of the clauses within these
three sections fits within this taxonomy, and each clause should
be read in light of the company it keeps. The Opinions Clause is
located in the Powers Section, and thus we should analyze it as
an important substantive power. Part A examines the text of
the Clause to describe the discretionary power that the Clause
vests in the president and highlight how it is the only explicit
textual power grant related to the president’s role over the dayto-day administration. Part B acknowledges the Opinions
Clause is a limited power and examines the three negative
implications for the broader executive power: (1) the president
does not have an absolute power to issue directives to officers, as
the Clause only vests the president with the power to require
opinions from those officers, (2) the president does not have an
absolute power to require inferior officers report to him directly,
as the Clause only vests the president with the authority over
the principal officers, and (3) the president does not have an
absolute power to remove executive officers. Given that this
45. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
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third implication has been so often debated throughout our
history, the unitary scholars’ counterarguments are then
refuted—particularly that removal and other powers are
granted by the Vesting Clause or other clauses in Article II.
A. The Opinions Clause and its Undeniable Unitary
Executive Power
Regardless of one’s views of the Vesting Clause, the
Opinions Clause is a clear power vested in the president alone.
Stating that the president “may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject related to the Duties of their respective
Offices,”46 the Clause establishes that the president has a
textually-enumerated grant of power to require any principal
officer to report to him. Before turning to the specific text, it is
important to reiterate the anti-unitary argument outlined
above: congress cannot contravene, restrict, or regulate the
ability of the president to have a principal officer give his or her
opinion.47 In this sense, it is what unitary scholars think of the
Vesting Clause: a textual power grant that cannot be infringed
by the other branches.
Article II’s overall structure and its other clauses also shed
light on the interpretation of the Opinions Clause. The Clause
is located in Section Two, or the Powers Section, surrounded by
the other enumerated power grants vested in the president. The
Clause’s neighbors, the Commander in Chief Clause, the Pardon
Clause, the Treaty-Making Clause, and the Nominations and
Vacancy Appointment Clause, are all important power grants
that presidents often cite when taking each respective action.48
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
47. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 32–38 (exploring a
conservative reading of the Clause); see also Amar, supra note 10, at 657–59
(finding that “may require” signifies the president is in a unique constitutional
position, as he is the top of the informational food chain within the executive
branch). Additionally, the State of the Union Clause, by comparison, grants
the president the discretion to pick and choose what he shares with Congress,
thereby tipping the balance between the three branches to the president
regarding facts on the ground. Amar, supra note 10, at 657–59.
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Amar, supra note 10, at 652
(collectively referring to the Clauses as the “opening triad” of power).
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Interestingly, the Opinions Clause is the only one of these power
grants that speaks to the president’s role in the day-to-day
administration of the non-military executive branch.49 In this
sense, the Opinions Clause represents the most important power
for the unitary executive: the ability to have the entire executive
branch responsible to him through opinions.
Building on this context, the Opinions Clause’s text
indicates that it confers on the president a substantive
discretionary power. He may require the principal officer to
report to him, but, in line with the Clause’s location in Section
Two, it places no duty on the president to take action.50 The
president thus has unlimited discretion to exercise this
authority when he sees fit. Generally speaking,51 the president
need not share an opinion that would negatively reflect on his
administration or which is contradictory to his stated position.
As a result, the president can only benefit from requiring an
opinion. However, as the unitary scholars point out, this clause
implicates the president’s accountability for the flow of
information within the executive branch.52 By telling us that the
president has this power, the Constitution also tells us to hold
the president accountable for informational breakdowns. In
other words, the president cannot stick his head in the sand to

49. As argued further below, the Appointments Clause deals exclusively
with the picking of personnel. Beyond choosing like-minded individuals, it
does not explicitly grant any substantive control over those officers.
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
51. There are three potential wrinkles to the president’s complete
discretion over the release of these opinions. Firstly, the Freedom of
Information Act could force disclosure of these opinions. See Judicial Watch,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that
executive privilege under FOIA does not apply to the attorney general, even if
the attorney general is advising the president). Secondly, these opinions could
be subject to congressional or judicial subpoena. The president could assert
executive privilege to protect the opinions, but this strategy is not absolute.
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Finally, the negative
opinion could leak, a recurring problem from administration to administration.
One might argue that these officers violate their oaths of office when they leak,
but the political harm to the president will be difficult to reverse. In sum, while
the opinion is mostly there for the president’s benefit, there could be situations
where a president’s decision to sit on an opinion could backfire.
52. See infra Part IV(B) notes 145–47 and accompanying text for in
illustration of this accountability; see also Amar, supra note 10, at 658–59;
Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005.
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shield himself.53 Furthermore, as Professors Prakash and Amar
state, this discretionary power establishes the president as the
chief administrator.54 The president’s discretionary authority to
require that principal officers report to him suggests that he is
above them in the executive hierarchy, at least in respect to the
information in the executive branch.
Relatedly, the Clause establishes an accountability on
behalf of the executive officer. By allowing for opinions in
writing, the Clause enables the president to require the officer
to provide a more thorough opinion, knowing that it could be
memorialized with the officer’s name on it.55 However, most
importantly, in writing suggests that the president will have
this information in the form of evidence that he has the
discretion to share as he sees fit. Under a knowledge-is-power
theory, the president can then use these reports as political
evidence, either taking the fight to congress, or taking the report
to the people to then hold congress responsible.56 As other
scholars have pointed out, an opinion in writing can assist the
president in a removal battle over an independent officer,57
53. As explained below, the unitary scholars wrongly suggest that this
means the president must also have unrestricted authority to take the action
or overrule the action taken by the officer. Rather, the accountability here is
that the president must know about the fact at issue, and then either take the
action under legal authority or inform us, his voters, to demand Congress put
a stop to the action in question. Contra Prakash, supra note 13.
54. See Amar, supra note 10, at 659; see also Prakash, supra note 13. At
the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell stated that “in writing”
would prevent presidential collusion with the Officer to falsify an opinion.
JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 108–10 (1888). Potential exposure of
the written evidence would chill such improper influence by the President.
While this is a valid point, it also shows that the clause contemplates potential
limits on presidential ability to improperly influence the officers charged with
executing the law.
55. See Amar, supra note 10, at 662. This is not to say that the Opinions
Power must always be in writing or have the officer’s name on it. See id. at
670.
56. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining that “in writing,”
so understood, is a greater power than private briefings in cabinet meetings,
so we should not read a negative implication from this Clause that Congress
could prohibit a principal officer from having a conversation with the president
about such information). The greater includes the lesser doctrine applies here.
Id.; see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850).
57.
See infra Part V(B)(3); see also J. Gregory Sidak, The
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either providing the cause itself, or giving the president evidence
for the advice and consent of the Senate or the ruling of an
Article III judge. Such written opinions may also shield the
president from any Take Care challenges in court, giving him
the ammunition to justify whatever actions his administration
takes.58
This power applies to the “principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments,”59 meaning that the president must be
able to seek opinions from all executive agencies, independent
or otherwise. Congress may not establish an agency and then
rely on Professors Sunstein and Lessig’s “radical reading” of the
Opinions Clause to suggest that the agency is headed by a head
of department rather than a principal Officer and, therefore, is
insulated from the president’s authority under the Opinions
Clause.60 This is too fine of a textual line to support an entire
fourth branch of government, particularly when the rest of the
Constitution so strongly suggests the three branches.61
Instead, the Opinions Clause guarantees the president the
absolute power to inform himself of law-enforcement’s innerworkings. The Clause vests a discretionary power, not a duty,
and it is a great power for the president in executing an agenda.
It arms the president with evidence, in writing, for political
Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2087 (1989) (stating “the
President can remove those who produce faulty or injudicious opinions”).
58. See infra Part V(B)(2) (discussing the Clause’s negative implication
for presidential power). This Section considers the idea that we should not
read the word opinion so strictly so as to exclude any factual information or
report. The Clause is meant to provide the President with adequate advice and
guarantee that he is responsible for all information in the executive branch.
See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
60. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 35–38, 72, 113 (putting forth
a radical reading of the Opinions Clause and the Inferior Officer’s Appointment
Clause by stating that (1) the difference between the principal officer of the
Opinions Clause and the heads of departments of the Inferior Officers
Appointment Clause actually represents two different sets of people, and (2)
the Opinions Clause only extends to the principal officer, thus creating a
“fourth branch” under the heads of departments that is outside the president’s
power, or at least outside the Opinions Power).
61. As this article will expand upon in Part B, the Clause applies to all
principal officers, but not all inferior officers. See infra notes 69–75 and
accompanying text. Congress could limit the President’s ability to demand
reports from an inferior officer. See infra notes 280–83 and accompanying text;
contra Amar, supra note 10, at 667.
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fights with congress, litigation in the Judiciary, and policy fights
within the executive branch.62 As discussed in the next section,
the Clause implies limitations on presidential power. But even
with these limitations, the Opinions Clause is an undeniable
unitary executive power.
B. The Opinions Clause and its Undeniable Limitation on
Executive Power
While the Opinions Clause undeniably vests the president
with the discretionary power defined above, it also presents
several implied negatives on the president’s constitutional
powers, particularly in relation to congress’s ability to regulate
the executive branch. In other words, the Opinions Clause is
significant not only for what it says, but also for what it does not
say.
First, the Opinions Clause vests the president with an
absolute power to require principal officers report to him, but,
by implication, this grant does not give the president the
absolute power to issue directives and orders to those officers.
Thus, congress can limit or restrict the president’s authority to
direct a principal officer to take a specific action. The same
reasoning applies to the second negative implication: by
granting the president the opinions power over the principal
officer, the Opinions Clause denies the president the absolute
authority to require opinions from inferior officers. To be clear,
the first implication allows congress to limit the president’s
authority to issue orders to officers, while the second implication
contemplates a limitation on the president’s authority to require
opinions from inferior officers. Finally, the Opinions Clause
negates any broader readings of the president’s absolute powers
over the day-to-day administration under the Vesting Clause,
the Take Care Clause, or even the Appointments Clause. One
important example of a power that is not absolutely vested in
the president is the removal power, which has long been justified
on the basis of these generic clauses.

62. See infra Part IV(B).
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1. Requiring Opinions “From” Does Not Include Issuing
Orders “To”
By granting the president the absolute power to require
opinions from principal officers, the Opinions Clause implies
that the president does not have an absolute power to order
those same officers take specific actions. As stated above,63 the
Opinions Clause prohibits congress from interfering with the
president’s power to receive and require reports from his
principal officers on any subject related to the duties of the
executive branch. But this absolute power to seek opinions does
not encompass the power to issue directives.64 Of course, this is
not to say that all executive orders heretofore have been
unconstitutional. On the contrary, insofar as congress has
delegated authority over a statutory scheme to the executive
branch, the president derives a default authority to issue such
directives both from the statutory delegation and from his duty
under the Take Care Clause.65 However, as explained below in
Section Four, the Take Care Clause is a passive-voiced duty to
follow the law, and thus this authority can be regulated by
63. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text.
64. It is also worth rebutting some other possible negative implications
of the Clause. As explained above, a strict reading of the word opinion to
exclude reports or facts does not make sense, particularly given the history of
the Clause. This is not to deny the originalist argument, which states that the
Clause serves a historical purpose by alleviating contemporary fears that the
newly-created President would go without advice. Surely, facts and reports
fall into this category. In fact, President Washington often informed Congress
of reports and statements he had received from his officers in his letters urging
legislative action. See Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the
U.S. Senate & U.S. House of Representatives, (Aug. 7, 1789), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0236 (“I have, therefore,
directed the several statements and papers, which have been submitted to me
on this subject by General Knox to be laid before you”). Additionally, Professor
Amar contemplated in Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, that the phrase
in writing might suggest Congress could restrict in-person briefings, requiring
that all executive communications be in writing. See generally Amar, supra
note 10 (emphasis added). However, an opinion in writing, with all of the
accountability placed on the officer, is surely a greater power than one-on-one
or cabinet meeting conversations. Thus, a greater includes the lesser theory
suggests verbal communications are covered by this Clause.
65. Importantly, this reading of the Opinions Clause applies exclusively
to the civilian, non-military government. The President has a clear directive
power over the national defense, and possibly even generic intelligence or
national security through the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
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congress.66 If congress feels the need to insulate a particular
executive department from political pressure, it can restrict the
president’s ability to order that department to take specific
actions.67
This first negative implication is further supported by
comparing the Opinions Clause to the Commander-in-Chief
Clause. The Commander-in-Chief Clause undoubtedly vests the
president with a directive power over military and national
security officers, particularly in times of war. The Clause also
overlaps with the Opinions Clause, in that “principal Officers”
certainly include the Secretary of Defense.68 But the comparison
illustrates the substantive difference between the two clauses
with respect to the civilian officers. As Peter Strauss points out
in A Softer Formalism, the Opinions Clause contemplates that
there will be officers who have duties delegated to them.69 Thus,
even though the Opinions Power is itself an active and
discretionary power, it establishes a relationship with the
civilian officers that is far more passive than the relationship
established under the Commander-in-Chief Clause. For the
military, the president’s orders are the officer’s duties. By
contrast, for the civilian administration, the officer’s duties are
defined by congress, and then subsequently reported to the
president. These roles are mirror images of each other,
illustrating that for the civilian government, the principal officer
is actually the active executive official and the president an
overseer.
2. The Principal Does Not Include the Inferior
Second, the Opinions Clause vests the president’s authority
66. See infra text accompanying notes 77–82.
67. Because of this default deference to the president, congress should
follow a clear statement rule if they choose to regulate the president’s ability
to issue these orders.
68. The original proposal of the Opinions Clause put forth by Gouverneur
Morris and Charles Pinckney at the convention listed the individual members
of the cabinet, and it included the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs. This
portion of the clause was scrapped, leaving it up to Congress to structure the
executive branch how it saw fit. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 342 (1911).
69. Strauss, supra note 32, at 59.
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to seek opinions from all principal officers, but it does not extend
to the inferior officers. Now, some may argue that a greaterincludes-the-lesser argument applies here: the power to have a
principal officer report to you is greater than the power to have
inferior officers report to you, and thus the president has the
latter because of the granting of the former.70 However, this
argument should not apply here. In this context, the power to
require opinions from inferior officers would be a greater power
than the authority over the principal officers. This balance of
powers rests on two assumptions: (1) the inferior and civil
officers are the persons actually executing the laws in individual
matters, whereas the principal officers are more managerial,
and (2) the president, by virtue of the office, imposes tremendous
political weight in every interaction, particularly with
subordinates within the executive branch.
Given these
assumptions, the power to require inferior officers to report
directly to the president risks allowing a president to use the
political clout of the office to improperly influence the otherwise
faithful execution of the law in a specific matter. This risk is not
as great when interacting with the managerial principal officer;
thus, the power over inferior officers is in fact greater than the
textually granted power over the cabinet.
In fact, in the early days of our Nation, President
Washington recognized the imposing presence of his office and
its potential negative effects on proper governmental functions.
President Washington and the First Senate discussed the proper
process for both the shared Appointments and Treaty-Making
powers.71 In these discussions, both branches acknowledged
that the President’s presence in the Senate chambers could
result in a chilling effect on the Senate’s deliberations. They
decided that President Washington would not be present for the
debate on nominees, citing improper influence imposed by “his
presence [on] the fullest and freest enquiry into the Character of
70. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850), for an example of the
Supreme Court applying a greater-includes-the-lesser logic to interpret
constitutional power grants, where the Court held that Congress’s greater
power to create the lower federal courts includes the lesser power to restrict
their jurisdiction.
71. Conference with a Committee of the United States Senate, 8 August
1789, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-03-02-0239 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
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the Person nominated.”72 Remarkably, President Washington
showed great self-awareness of the political powers of his office
and the potential it created for improperly influencing the
Senate—a coequal branch with respect to the Appointments and
Treaty-Making power. Surely, a president could have an even
greater impact on the inferior officers within the executive
branch.
More recently, the executive branch instituted guidelines
aimed at guarding against this improper presidential influence
on matters handled by inferior officers. The post-Watergate
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued memos restricting the
White House from contacts with the civilian and inferior officers
within the DOJ, a strong reaction to the constitutional moment
of presidential overreach.
Beginning with the Carter
administration, the Department of Justice issued a policy memo
to insulate attorneys and investigative officers from presidential
or White House inquiry, reflecting the notion that such inquiries
could improperly influence individual investigations.73 Instead,
these memos established a process for presidential inquiry: the
White House Counsel must submit the inquiry to the Attorney
General, who then screens out such inquiries that may be
improper from reaching the lower inferior or civil officer
pursuing the case.74
This process mirrors the principal-versus-inferior negative
implication in the Opinions Clause. Although the Opinions
Clause vests the president with absolute power to require
principal officers report to him “upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of the respective Offices,” the Clause does not mention
inferior officers,75 implying that the president does not have the
same absolute power over them. Here, the DOJ policies reflect
this hierarchy. The president maintains his constitutional right
72. Id.
73. Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the Great Hall Before
Department of Justice Lawyers 7–8 (September 6, 1978) (transcript available
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-06-1978b
.pdf); Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep’t
Components: All U.S. Attorneys (May 11, 2009), https://lawfare.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/staging/2017/2009%20Eric%20Holder%20memo.pdf
(referencing a memo by 2007 Attorney General Michael Mukasey).
74. Bell, supra note 73, at 7–8.
75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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to inquire or communicate with the principal officer, in this case
the Attorney General. However, the Attorney General can then
screen these communications from reaching the inferior officers
within the DOJ. This process enables the Attorney General to
maintain the political independence in law enforcement, a
benefit to this reading of the Opinions Clause.
Part V will expand on the DOJ policy, but it is used as an
example here to preempt the argument that the principal officer
inherently encompasses direct reporting from the inferior
officer. Thus, the negative implication stands: by limiting the
textual grant of power to the president to principal officers, the
Clause implies that the president does not have unlimited
constitutional authority to reach into the executive departments
for one-on-one interactions with the inferior officers. As one
example of the practical significance of this limitation on the
Opinions Power, Article II and the Opinions Clause would not
bar Congress from codifying the Holder Memo into law, should
it wish to. Of course, Congress is not authorized to pass such a
law under Article II, but rather would need an Article I, Section
8 justification for the law. It should not be controversial, insofar
as Congress has the power to create the Department of Justice
to enforce the laws passed by Congress; it is necessary and
proper to ensure those laws are enforced independently and not
corruptly.76
3. The Removal Power
Relatedly, the Opinions Clause and Section Two as a whole
negate reading an absolute removal power for the president. To
be clear, the first two executive power limitations are implied by
the text of the Opinions Clause, whereas the negative
implication on the president’s absolute removal power stems
from the lack of a removal clause in Section Two.77 The framers
76. See Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of
Independent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The
Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 367–68 (1987)
(summarizing Buckley v. Valeo as recognizing the need for Congress to insulate
the FEC from the President due in large part to the FEC’s “sensitive role in
the oversight and possible prosecution of political candidates”).
77. Again, as with the power to issue directives, the default rule derived
from both the statutory delegation and the Take Care Clause is that the
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granted the president the limited Opinions Clause power, but
they did not grant the president an absolute removal power
through a Removal Clause. In fact, the original proposal for the
Opinions Clause at the convention made the Cabinet serve “at
the pleasure of the president,”78 but the framers removed this
phrase when they drafted the final Opinions Clause.79 Thus, not
only is there no Removal Clause, but we also know the framers
considered and rejected including such a phrase within the
Opinions Clause, signifying that the text of Section Two should
be read as denying the president an absolute removal power.
Vesting the president with an unlimited and unenumerated
removal power renders the limited Opinions Clause
redundant.80 To illustrate, the textually granted Opinions
Power versus the textual removal power evokes the inverse of
the constitutional theory discussed above: the lesser power
excludes the greater power.81 One would assume that the power
to remove an officer for any reason would include the power to
require that officer report to the president. On the other hand,
the power to require an officer’s opinion does not include the
power to then fire that officer, particularly if the opinion reflects
a faithful execution of the law.82 Because no other power listed
in Article II, Section Two grants the removal power, the only
argument for the power rests on the unitary scholars’ reading of
the Vesting Clause, which will now be analyzed and refuted.
4. The Rebuttal of the Unitary Scholars’ Argument
Unitary scholars insist that either the Vesting Clause or the

President can remove any officer. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying
text. Here, Congress needs to meet the clear statement rule by including
phrases, such as for good cause only. Id.
78. FARRAND , supra note 68, at 342. At the “pleasure” of the President
signifies that the President could remove the officials as he pleases.
79. See infra Part IV(A) notes 102–24 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the debate at the Convention; see also supra note 41 for
more on this revision.
80. See A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency
Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 800 (1987).
81. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (assigning to the president a duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed”).
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Take Care Clause grant the president the powers excluded by
the limited Opinions Clause. For instance, if the Vesting Clause
actually grants the president with a textually unlimited
executive power, then surely the president has the absolute
power to issue directives, require opinions from the inferior
officers, and remove at-will any executive branch official.83 As
explained above, this reading requires accepting the Opinions
Clause as redundant. However, the text and structure of Article
II negate this broad and textually unlimited reading of executive
power. This Section considers and rejects any arguments that
other clauses override the three limitations of the Opinions
Clause, and then consider and reject the unitary scholars’
argument that the three Vesting Clauses84 all serve as
substantive power grants.
Before refuting the Take Care Clause and the Vesting
Clause arguments, consider that the Opinions Clause is the only
textually granted power vested in the president encompassing
the day-to-day administration of the executive branch. That is,
it is the only clause in Section Two, the powers section, that
enumerates the president’s power in the general administration
of the Government.85 Presumably, the Nominations Power (with
the full Appointment Power shared with the senate), indicates
at least partial presidential authority over the selection of
personnel.86 Although it implies that the president will select
officers who agree with his views on law execution, it does not
directly speak to nor give the president authority to ensure those
officers follow his views in their subsequent tenures. In other
words, the Opinions Clause applies to the appointed officials
once they are confirmed and sworn-in.
Outside of the Powers Section, unitary scholars would point
to the Take Care Clause as requiring the president have the
83. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1, cl. 1; see generally supra note 21.
85. This generally contrasts the Opinions Clause with the Pardon Clause
or the Commander-in-Chief Clause. The pardon power is specific to the
criminal justice system and the Commander-in-Chief Clause is specific to the
military. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. By contrast, the Opinions Clause
generally applies to the entire executive branch, including both the military
and pardons. Id.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 4.
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power to circumvent any of the limitations implied in the
Opinions Clause,87 but the Take Care Clause differs from the
Opinions Clause in two key ways. First, it is a duty, located in
the Duties Section of Article II. As Justice Scalia noted in
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the imbalance between the duty of the Take
Care Clause and the power of the Necessary and Proper Clause
tips the balance of power towards congress.88 Just as the
Necessary and Proper Clause is a power, so too is the Opinions
Clause. It is a power located in Article II, Section Two,89 thus it
bars congress from regulating how or if the president can
“require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer.”90
Second, not only is the Take Care Clause a duty unlike the power
given by the Opinions Clause, it is written in the passive voice:
“[the president] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”91 Justice Scalia correctly identified how this passive
voice suggested a power imbalance between the Take Care
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.92 Likewise, the
same imbalance exists between the passive Take Care Clause
and the active Opinions Clause. The Opinions Clause is an
affirmative and discretionary power grant that cannot be
regulated by congress. By contrast, the Take Care Clause is a
duty that can be regulated by congress. Therefore, the argument
for presidential power based on the absolute Opinions Clause
beats an argument based on the regulable Take Care Clause.93
87. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16 at 583, 621 (arguing that
while it is a duty, the Take Care Clause confirms that the President has the
executive power granted from the Vesting Clause).
88. 135 S.Ct. 2076, 2125 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating “[i]t turns
the Constitution upside-down to suggest that in areas of shared authority, it is
the executive policy that preempts the law, rather than the other way around.
Congress may make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
President’s powers, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, but the President must ‘take Care’ that
Congress’s legislation ‘be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3”) (emphasis in
original).
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
90. Id.; McCulloch v. Maryland is another example of the Supreme
Court’s reading a clause in light of its placement in the powers section. Chief
Justice John Marshall rejects the state of Maryland’s narrow reading of the
clause because it is placed in Article I Section 8 – the “powers” section for
Congress. 17 U.S. 316, 419 (1819).
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
92. See Zivotofsky, 135 S.Ct. at 2125.
93. The Opinions Power cannot be regulated by Congress, unlike the
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After the Take Care Clause, we are left with the most often
debated clause, the Vesting Clause, as a potential grant of power
in the negative spaces left by the Opinions Clause. The three
negative implications discussed in this section—the absolute
power to issue orders, the absolute power to require opinions
from inferior officers, and the absolute power to remove
officers—would likely be covered by a substantive Vesting
Clause.94 For instance, a president with an all-powerful
executive power would surely be able to speak to or require the
opinion of any officer, civil, inferior, principal, or otherwise,
within the executive branch. However, as summarized in Part
II(A), supra, past scholars have aptly pointed out that the
Opinions Clause by itself implies a non-substantive reading of
the Vesting Clause.95 Most obviously, the Opinions Clause is a
specific power and, as shown here, it is a limited power. Not only
would a substantive vesting clause render the Opinions Clause
redundant, it would render it absurd. Why include in Section
Two an explicit and limited grant of power if some implicit and
yet unlimited power contained in the Vesting Clause would
Take Care duty. See id. at 2116–26, (Scalia, J., dissenting). As this debate
centers on what Article II bars Congress from regulating, the Opinions Clause
is a far stronger Clause.
94. Still, none of these powers are covered by the text. Thus, even if you
assume the Vesting Clause is a substantive grant of power beyond the
enumerated powers, you still need to argue why a certain power is executive
in nature. Professors Calabresi and Prakash included the unrestricted
constitutional right to remove all executive officials, to act in their stead, and
to overrule any of their decisions. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at
595. It is assumed, for the purposes of this article, that they and other classic
Unitary Executive scholars would argue that all of the negative implications
of the Opinions Clause would be covered by the Vesting Clause. This would be
a safe assumption because Professors Calabresi and Prakash argued that the
Opinions Clause itself was likely redundant. Still, the executive power is open
to debate, and because it is so divorced from the text, it can be used to justify
a quasi-suspensions power, suspending Habeas Corpus, and even torture. See
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003)
(on file with the Fed’n of Am. Sci.).
95. See supra Part II(A). Again, the structural argument is important
here; the Vesting Clause is in the “naming” section, or Section One. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Every other clause in that section describes the office
of the presidency while not vesting any substantive powers. Reading the
Vesting Clause as a substantive power grant decontextualizes the Clause from
its surroundings. The Opinions Clause, by contrast, is a specified power right
in the opening of Section Two, the Powers Section.
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render nugatory the limits of the expressly delegated power?96
Furthermore, this redundancy reading97 contravenes the
constitutional maxim that, where powers are listed and others
are excluded, the exclusion is meaningful. This constitutional
expressio unius canon dates back to Marbury v. Madison,
wherein the Court rejected its power to issue a mandamus to
certain officers because it was not enumerated in Article III’s
original jurisdiction.98 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that
“[a]ffirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of
other objects than those affirmed; and . . . a negative or exclusive
sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.”99
Marshall also cautioned that “it cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and
therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words
require it.”100 In this case, the unitary reading of the Vesting
Clause denies the Opinions Clause its exclusive sense, leaving it
with no operation at all.
Luckily, there is a more natural reading of Article II. The
Vesting Clause is in the naming section,101 establishing the office
of the Presidency vested with the powers listed in Section Two,
home of the Opinions Clause. The unitary scholars’ theory
requires us to decontextualize these two clauses: the Vesting
Clause as a power grant in the naming section and the Opinions
Clause as a descriptive redundancy in the powers section. If one
removes the Vesting Clause from Article II, Section One and
then reads through the remaining clauses that name the
96. While, in practice, citing Vesting Clause authority may be how
presidents exercise an opinions-like power, that does not mean that we should
take a president’s word for it because any branch given blanket authority will
aggrandize power.
97. See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text.
98. 5 U.S. 137, 174–75 (1803).
99. Id. at 174.
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article Two Section One’s other clauses
establish the term of office, the vice president, the mode and date of election,
citizenship and age requirements, compensation and emoluments, and finally
the Oath of Office. Id. None of these clauses vest any substantive powers in
the president; instead, they describe the office. Id. The Vesting Clause also
describes the office, stating that it will be held by one person. Id. To make it
clearer, the Removal Clause, since amended by the Twenty Fifth Amendment,
refers to the power and duties of the office, a phrase that maps nicely onto the
powers and duties sections. Id.
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characteristics of the office, one does not expect the next clause
to vest any substantive powers. Rather, the next clause logically
should name another characteristic of the office. In this case,
that characteristic is that we have one president. By contrast,
reading Section Two’s other clauses, one is not expecting to see
a clause merely describing the office of the Presidency. Instead,
one is looking for the next power to be vested in the president.
Here, that power is the Opinions Clause.
In sum, the text of the Opinions Clause vests the president
with a discretionary, but limited, power. It implies that the
president does not have absolute powers to remove officials,
issue directives, or reach into the executive departments and
demand reports from the inferior officers. Through these
limitations, it rebuts the unitary scholars’ theory that the
Vesting Clause or Article II in general grant the president with
plenary but textually unlimited executive powers. A substantive
Opinions Clause and a non-substantive Vesting Clause is the far
more natural reading of Article II’s text, and it matches the
history of the Opinions Clause at the convention and the
framers’ republican intent for the executive power.
IV. The Original Opinions Clause: The Framers
and Their Republican Intent
The textual argument set forth in Part III is supported by
the history and the intent of the Constitution, particularly in the
framing of the Presidency. In the past, unitary scholars have
pointed to the Clause’s introduction at the Convention by
Charles Pinckney and Gouverneur Morris, two framers strongly
in favor of a unitary executive, as evidence in support of that
theory. But, in Part A, the history of the proposal is reexamined,
showing that the significant revisions made by the separate
Committee of Eleven speak to the meaning of the actual clause
the framers adopted. Then, Part B recounts the republican
intent of the presidency, namely that the executive power serves
as a sufficient check on the legislature. It is argued that the
Opinions Clause as written serves this purpose.
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A. Fitting the Opinions Clause in the Convention’s History
and Intent
Throughout the convention, the debate over the executive
power mirrored the debate scholars have to this day: what does
it mean to have a unitary executive? The Vesting Clause solves
this debate to the extent that at least the executive powers
defined in Article II would be vested in a single officer: the
president.102 As other scholars have pointed out,103 the Opinions
Clause was introduced near the end of the convention,
representing the moment where it was finally settled that we
would have one president in place of a council.
There are two key moments for interpreting the Opinions
Clause on the basis of the framers’ original intent. First,
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney proposed an Opinions
Clause that was much broader than the final version left in the
Constitution. From this proposal, we can safely assume that
Morris and Pinckney thought it necessary to enumerate the
Opinions Power, suggesting that they did not believe such a
power was encompassed in the already-written Vesting Clause.
Second, the Committee of Eleven revised the Clause and
eliminated the broad provisions from the Morris and Pinckney
proposal. These revisions imply that the framers did not want
to vest the president with the absolute powers and duties
inherent in the original proposal. Instead, they wanted to leave
these questions open for us to decide through statutes.
The proposal introduced by Gouverneur Morris and Charles
Pinckney was a broad and detailed plan for the president’s
powers over the executive branch.104 The proposal vested the

102. See infra Part I, notes 1 and 2 for Mason and Hamilton’s
disagreements (explaining how the naming function actually serves the
greatest historical significance). The debate at the convention over executive
power centered more on whether to have one executive or to have a council,
and not whether that executive would have an unchecked removal power, for
instance. Thus, if we take their structure to mean that the powers are listed
in Section Two, then we can read the Vesting Clause as solving the actual
debate at the Convention by vesting those powers in the President, and not in
a Council. The President has the authority to require the opinions, in writing,
of the principal officers; a council does not. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
103. Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005.
104. FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342.
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president with the power to “submit any matter to the discussion
of the Council of State, and he may require the written opinions
of any one or more of the members: But he shall in all cases
exercise his own judgment, and either Conform to such opinions
or not as he may think proper.”105 Additionally, the proposal
stated each of the secretaries, with the exception of the Chief
Justice, “shall be appointed by the President and hold his office
during pleasure”106 while also including an impeachment clause
for “neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption.”107
The introduction of the Opinions Clause at the convention
implies that its powers were not assumed in the Vesting Clause,
which had already been written. Professors Prakash and
Calabresi argue to the contrary: the two delegates behind the
Opinions Clause proposal, Gouverneur Morris and Charles
Pinckney, were pro-unitary executive, supposedly undermining
the Clause’s implied restrictions on executive power.108
However, that pro-unitary executive framers introduced this
Clause suggests they felt the need to explain the executive
framework they envisioned; a particularly significant suggestion
considering the opposing viewpoints at the Convention.
Pinckney and Morris weren’t the only framers. Although they
were strongly in favor of a unitary executive, others, like George
Mason, were strongly opposed to one president.109 Though they
favored the Virginia Plan that envisioned a president with great
unitary powers, others favored the New Jersey Plan for a plural
executive.110 Of course, those in favor of a unitary executive won
out in the end,111 but it is important to remember these disputes
when determining the extent to which they won. Given that the
Vesting Clause establishing a singular president had already

105. Id. at 343–44. The “Council of State” included the Secretaries of
Domestic Affairs, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, War and the Chief Justice. Id.
106. Id. at 342. In some sense, this also serves to rebut Sunstein and
Lessig’s argument that the removal of the chief justice from this Clause and
the subsequent lack of authority over the chief justice carries any weight. The
chief justice was recognized even in the original proposal as a separate and
distinct figure. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 33–34.
107. FARRAND, supra note 68, at 343–44.
108. Id. at 630–31; see also supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
109. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 23.
110. Id. at 39.
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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been written at the time, Morris and Pinckney’s proposal could
be read as these unitary framers’ next big play to define what
powers a singular president would have.112 Under their
proposal, the president would have complete powers over a
constitutionally-created cabinet. Though perhaps Morris and
Pinckney believed such powers were inherent in the executive
power in the Vesting Clause, at the very least, they thought it
ambiguous enough to submit this proposal in the Convention’s
final month.113
Furthermore, Morris and Pinckney’s views do not explain
the motives behind the revision and the ultimate clause that we
have today. The Opinions Clause is the result of revisions by the
Committee of Eleven, of which Gouverneur Morris, but not
Charles Pinckney, was a member.114 To illustrate the varied
opinions on the Committee, Hugh Williamson, another member,
stated that he strongly opposed “Unity in the Executive” and
instead wished the power would be “lodged in three men taken
from three districts into which the States would be divided.”115
Another member, Roger Sherman, was on the record as
preferring an executive branch that was “nothing more than an
institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect,
112. The Opinions Clause proposal was met with George Mason’s lastditch effort for a plural executive, suggesting that even this fight was not over
with. Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005–06. The Convention rejected Mason’s
proposal, and then revised the Opinions Clause. Id. Still, one must weigh the
opposing viewpoints to a strong unitary executive in deciphering exactly what
unitary powers the framers vested in the President.
113. The proposal was submitted in August, and the Convention
adjourned in September. NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON
167–70 (1st ed. 2017). As has been documented, the framers in favor of the
Constitution were anxious to break from the Convention and get to the
ratification fights. Id. Any additional proposals at the end of the Convention
could have risked losing the emerging consensus, thereby threatening the
Constitution altogether. That such a proposal be made at this time suggests
that the sponsors thought it very important. On September 13th, Madison
made a reasonable suggestion that the other framers voted down in a lopsided
vote, as they were “in no mood for a hairsplitting debate.” Id. at 166. Randolph
moved for a new convention, which was rejected unanimously. Id. at 168.
114.
Committees
at
the
Constitutional
Convention,
U.S.
CONSTITUTION.NET (Jan. 24, 2010), https://www.usconstitution.net/constcmte
.html (listing the Third Committee of Eleven for August 31st).
115. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 358
(1845).
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that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only.”116 We have no explanation
for what motivated their revisions, and thus are only left to
speculate based on the final text of the Constitution. Textually,
the Committee of Eleven’s revisions are more important than
the original proposal because, not only were the revisions quite
significant, but they also represent the most proximate debate
on the true meaning of the Opinions Clause and its impact on
the rest of Article II. The Committee of Eleven’s revisions are
the text that was adopted and ratified, and so we turn to them
now.
Although it is acknowledged that parts of the original
proposal, particularly the at the pleasure service and the
Presidential Discretion Clause suggest a broader power for the
president, these broader presidential power provisions are what
the Committee of Eleven ultimately struck. The Committee of
Eleven eliminated the president’s authority over the chief
justice, the at the pleasure of the President service of the cabinet,
and that the president must act on his own judgment.117 First,
the Committee of Eleven’s decision to strike the Chief Justice
from the president’s authority likely reflected a hesitancy with
blending the two separate branches of government. Professors
Sunstein and Lessig, on the other hand, cite the removal of the
chief justice from the president’s authority as evidence that the
Opinions Clause is a necessary power grant.118 Because we
acknowledge the president does not have the authority to
require the opinion from the chief justice, they argue we can
infer the president does not have any other powers that are not
otherwise expressly granted.119 In other words, because the
116. Id. at 140.
117. Compare FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342–44 with U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1. The “shall in all cases exercise his own judgment and either
conform to such opinions or not as he may think proper” could read as imposing
a duty on the president to always analyze the opinions given by the officer. See
FARRAND, supra note 68 at 342. By striking this language, it is possible the
framers wanted to ensure the president had the freedom to defer to the
principal officer’s opinion without having to do legwork on every question.
However, the proposal still enabled the president to conform to the opinions
when proper. Also, the duty to exercise individual judgment is likely imposed
on the president by the Take Care Clause.
118. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 33–34.
119. Id.
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Committee of Eleven removed both the chief justice and the atwill clauses, we can analogize the president’s lack of authority
over the chief justice to his arguable lack of authority to remove
officers at will.120 Professors Calabresi and Prakash rebut this
argument by stating that these are two separate and coequal
branches of government, and thus we need a clear statement in
the Constitution to enable the president to have authority over
the chief justice.121 By contrast, they argue we do not need it
spelled out that the president has such authority over
subordinate officers within the executive branch.122
Professors Calabresi and Prakash are correct insofar as the
removal of the Chief Justice from the Opinions Clause does not
affect the executive power under Article II, but instead
exemplifies the framers’ recommitment to the Separation of
Powers. Rather than focus on that revision, we should focus on
the key revision shedding light on executive power: the removal
of the at the pleasure of language. This revision shows that the
framers considered vesting the president with an absolute power
to remove Cabinet officials, but instead decided that this issue
should not be resolved by the Constitution for all officials. Thus,
congress, assuming it has the power to pass a law under the
Necessary and Proper Clause,123 can regulate the president’s
removal authority. Under the Take Care Clause, the president
must faithfully abide by that law.
Of course, one could argue that the elimination of the at the
pleasure of the President language implies that the framers
thought this was redundant given the Vesting Clause. However,
this redundancy argument is undercut by what they left: if they
truly thought stating presidential ability to remove the officers
at will was redundant, then why did they leave the ability to
require the opinion in writing from these same officers? Surely,
an all-powerful executive power that includes the plenary
removal power also includes the ability to ask those fired-anyday-now officers’ opinions. In other words, the proposal and its
revision undermine the substantive Vesting Clause argument.
Why strike the at the pleasure of the President language while
120.
121.
122.
123.
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leaving in the current Opinions Clause? Of all the phrases in
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney’s original proposal,
the Opinions Clause as revised and ratified seems like the
weakest presidential power, and, therefore, the strangest truism
to restate.
This history indicates that the framers and the Committee
of Eleven intended to leave to future congresses the issue of the
president’s power to remove officers, and, by extension, to issue
directives.124 To further illustrate, the Committee of Eleven
removed the specified Secretaries from the original proposal,
leaving us with the principal officers. In effect, this decision
avoided having a constitutionally-created cabinet, and instead
left it up to congress to structure the executive branch through
laws, which congress has continuously done throughout our
history without any claim that it is intruding on the executive
power.125 Similarly, they did not want to settle the question of
at-will removal, preferring to leave the question up to congress.
By analogy to congress’ subsequent structuring of the executive
departments, congress can also regulate the president’s ability
to remove the officers.126 In other words, the Committee of
Eleven balked at a constitutionally-created cabinet subject to
absolute direction and removal by the president.
B. The Republican Intent for the Presidency Served by the
Opinions Clause
Throughout the drafting and ratification process, James
Madison and other framers made it clear that the Constitution
aimed to guard against the tyranny of the majority. In
124. The absolute removal power certainly includes the power to issue
directives to officers. Therefore, both questions are left unsettled by the
Committee of Eleven’s decision to remove the at the pleasure of the President
language.
125. Note that Congress does not have an explicit power grant to
structure the executive branch as it does in Article III. Yet, it is still up to
Congress to provide for the executive departments. Compare U.S. CONST. art.
III, § I, with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
126. This is also a form of a greater-includes-the-lesser argument; the
greater power to create and structure the executive branch through law implies
the lesser power to define those officer’s status. This same argument applies
to Congress’ authority to create the lower federal courts; see generally U.S.
CONST. art. III, § I.
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Federalist No. 10, James Madison wrote that the greatest threat
in a democracy was the threat of faction—interest groups and
political parties that captured the legislature and gained
unlimited political power to enact their policies.127 James
Madison believed a strong national government would quell
what he saw as a local problem.128 James Madison and the
framers chose a unitary executive in part to have the energy and
vigor to combat the majoritarian congress.129
The PreConstitution state governments had taught them this key
lesson.130 In the early days of American independence, antiaristocratic populists hungered for a responsive democracy
represented by a legislature, rather than a strong executive
resembling the King they detested.131 Pennsylvania’s 1776
Constitution is perhaps the best example of this first wave of
state constitutions. Pennsylvania had a plural executive council
instead of a unitary governor, and the council had no veto power
over the legislature. As a result, the Pennsylvania legislature
quickly wrote the executive branch effectively out of the
constitutional framework by law.132 The council was left with
dwindling authority over the law’s execution, no powers to
127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
128. Id. (writing that one of the principles of a republic that can control
faction is the “greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over
which the [elected representatives] may be extended”).
129. MADISON DEBATES, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates
_721.asp. James Madison on July 21, 1787, responding to an objection to the
sharing of the executive and the judiciary in the veto power, stated “[i]t was
much more to be apprehended that notwithstanding this co-operation of the
two departments, the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them.
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature
to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the
American Constitutions; & [he] suggested the necessity of giving every
defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with
republican principles.” Id.
130. Id.
131. Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power
in the Founding Decade, 496 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 45
(1988).
132. See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 17751789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 33 (Johns Hopkins Press 1923).
Despite it being unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania legislature appointed
officers outside the council to manage the treasury and even command the
militia. Both powers were vested in the executive council by the constitution,
but the lack of a veto and a politically powerful executive rendered the question
moot. See id.
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combat the legislature, and no single voice with which to speak
to the people.133
Runaway legislatures paved the way for the second wave of
state constitutions: those based more on republican principles.134
The key to these constitutions was the strengthening of the
executive branch, equipping it with the tools necessary to protect
itself from encroachment by the state legislatures. New York’s
Constitution created the strongest state executive as of that
point. The governor, with the help of a council, had the power to
veto laws for either policy or constitutional reasons. The
governor also shared with his council the power to appoint
officers and judges of the courts.135 As a result, New York’s
governorship was a politically powerful office and, as many
scholars have pointed out, the first state-level model for the
federal Presidency.136
Unsurprisingly, given the experience in the states, the
framers feared an overly powerful legislature on the federal
level. In fact, Madison believed that the legislative power could
result in tyranny equally dangerous to that of a king. In
Federalist No. 48, he wrote:
The legislative department is everywhere
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing
all power into its impetuous vortex. The founders
of our republics have so much merit for the
wisdom which they have displayed, that no task
can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the
errors into which they have fallen. A respect for
truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they
seem never for a moment to have turned their
eyes from the danger to liberty from the
overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an [sic]
hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by
133. See Williams, supra note 131, at 45–46; see also THACH, supra note
132, at 33–35 (discussing the executive council’s failing efforts to write letters
to the legislature).
134. Williams, supra note 131, at 47.
135. Id. at 47–48, 51.
136. McConnell, supra note 21, at 4; see also THACH, supra note 132, at
40–41.
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an [sic] hereditary branch of the legislative
authority. They seem never to have recollected the
danger from legislative usurpations, which, by
assembling all power in the same hands, must
lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by
executive usurpations.137
In other words, James Madison recognized that state
framers had been so opposed to the executive power that they
failed to realize the authoritarian potential of the legislature.
This fear of a runaway legislature is reflected in the
structure and text of our government. For instance, the framers
created a bicameral legislature to lessen the potential influence
of factions, varying the terms and the constituencies of the
individual members of each body.138 They vested the president
with veto power, a fundamental and necessary check on the
legislature. At various times throughout the Convention, they
contemplated joining the president and the Judiciary in a dualbranch Council of Revision to combat the congress.139 Already,
we see that the framers had effectively addressed many of the
concerns presented by the experience in Pennsylvania and the
other early state constitutions. Still, it’s not enough to have one
president with the power to veto the laws passed by congress,
particularly when congress can then override that veto with a
two-thirds majority.
The concerns of the Pennsylvania
executive’s lack of a singular voice and lack of authority over the
law’s execution still required a further remedy.
Similar to the Council of Revision, the original Opinions
Clause proposal included the chief justice as part of the
president’s Council of State, again suggesting that the framers
were so worried about the all-powerful legislature that they
considered breaking their separation of powers norm to protect
137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
“In republican
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy
for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches and
to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action,
as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and
their common dependence on the society will admit.” Id.
139. MADISON DEBATES, supra note 129 (referring to Madison’s
comments).
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the president and the Judiciary.140 Although we do not have
evidence from the convention for the original reason that
Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney included the chief
justice in the president’s Council of State, we can infer from the
debates over the Council of Revision that they likely wanted to
guard against the powerful legislature. Gouverneur Morris
previously supported connecting the president with the
Judiciary in the exercise of the veto power in the form of a
Council of Revision.141 In debating the Council of Revision,
Nathaniel Gorham motioned to join the judges with the
president; Oliver Ellsworth seconded the motion, stating that
the “aid of the Judges will give more wisdom & firmness to the
Executive. They will possess a systematic and accurate
knowledge of the Laws, which the Executive can not [sic] be
expected always to possess.”142 Ellsworth’s concerns are the
same as those addressed by the Opinions Clause: the president
will need adequate information to check congress.
The Opinions Clause, even read in its narrowest light,
provides the president with the power to effectuate this
republican check against the tyranny of the majority. The
unitary executive gives us an executive branch responsible to the
entire country. However, this accountability does not require
the president be able to direct any or all of the law’s execution,
nor does it require him to have the plenary power of removal.
Instead, it requires the president to be able to speak to us, his
voters, with a unitary voice. With the Opinions Clause, the
framers effectively guaranteed that the president would be in
the unique constitutional position to be able to know everything
in the executive branch on behalf of us. No individual senator,
congressperson, or even majority party in the Senate or House
has this power. In a conflict, they have to conduct messy
investigations with majoritarian votes required to subpoena
individuals and information. Alternatively, they have to pass
laws, getting bills out of committee with majority votes, through
each house, and then through the Conference Committee to then
present the law to the president to sign. Then, of course, is the
issue of speaking with one voice—even should the Senate or
140. FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342–43.
141. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 633.
142. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 107.
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House gain access to the key information, they will first need to
reach at the very least a majoritarian consensus on how to read
and communicate that information to us.143
By contrast, the president may require reports on any
subject within the executive branch—there is nothing of note
within the executive branch that the president cannot effectively
investigate.
In Pennsylvania, the state legislature could
completely usurp the executive power from the council and cut
them out of the loop. In effect, this left the council without the
power to obtain opinions from these non-executive officers, and
thus they could not adequately defend themselves to the
people.144 For the president, the indefeasible power ensured by
the Opinions Clause grants the ability to provide the check that
was absent in Pennsylvania. Herein lies true republican
constitutional accountability: the president, elected by the entire
nation, can demand the report from the principal officer
overseeing any facet of the law’s execution. Then, if the

143. A recent example illustrates the disadvantage Congress faces as
opposed to the Opinions Power: the Republican majority in the House
Intelligence Committee released a memo discrediting the FBI’s Russia-related
investigation into American citizens. However, political pressure then forced
a vote to release the Democratic minority memo that directly refuted the
Republicans’ claims. Compare Memorandum from the U.S. House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence Majority Staff to the U.S. House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence Majority Members (Jan. 18, 2018) (on file with
the U.S. House of Representatives), with Memorandum from the U.S. House
Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence Minority to the House of
Representatives (Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with the U.S. House of
Representatives). No such dissent exists for the President, who has the unitary
authority to speak with an opinion in hand. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
144. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); THACH,
supra note 132. The Pennsylvania executive council complained to the
legislature that the laws passed, such as vesting defense of the Delaware River
in a non-executive officer, violated the Constitution. Presumably, the
executive council did not possess the authority to require reports from that
non-executive officer. Id. Interestingly, the Pennsylvania State Constitution
vested an Opinions-like power in the Council of Censors, which was a quasiconvention to be elected for a one-year term, every seven years, to review the
Constitution. Id. The Clause stated: “[f]or these purposes they shall have
power to send for persons, papers, and records; they shall have authority . . .
to recommend to the legislature the repealing such laws as appear to them to
have been enacted contrary to the principles of the constitution.” PA. CONST.
of 1776, § 47. This is perhaps the earliest known precursor to the Opinions
Clause, but it suggests that the power serves as a conational and republican
check on legislative abuses.
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president has the legal authority, he can direct a specific policy
change or even remove a poorly performing officer. However,
even if the president is confined by law in such a way that prounitary scholars fear, the president still has the ability to take
these reports to congress or his voters and call on us to hold our
congressperson’s or senator’s feet to the fire.
In addition to the power to hold congress accountable, the
Opinions Clause also demands accountability from the president
as it denies him the ability to hide behind the Cabinet. The
Opinions Clause makes it clear: the president is responsible to
the voters for all actions taken by the executive branch.145 In
other words, if the executive branch fails in its duty and the
president says he didn’t know about it, the voters can point to
the clause and demand an explanation for the informational
breakdown. Even in situations where the president lacks the
legal authority to take immediate corrective action, the vision of
a republican check on congress outlined here demands that the
president explain his lack of authority to us with the help of an
opinion.
For example, President Trump recently blamed the FBI for
their failure to act on tips on the shooter at Marjorie Stoneman
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida.146 However, these
situations are exactly the type that the Opinions Clause lays at
the president’s feet. President Trump, through the Opinions
Clause, is responsible for all information within the executive
branch, which certainly includes the FBI’s efforts to protect us
from violent actors. After prior shootings, the President could
145. In this sense, the Opinions Clause serves the accountability
interests behind having a unitary executive. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton) (“But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in
the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that
it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two
kinds to censure and to punishment . . . the multiplication of the Executive
adds to the difficulty of detection in either case.”); see also Amar, supra note
10, at 661; Prakash, supra note 13, at 1006–07.
146. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2018, 8:08
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/965075589274177536?ref_
msrc=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Farticles%2F
trump-weekend-tweetstorm-responds-to-mueller-indictment-1518967910
(stating “[v]ery sad that the FBI missed all of the many signals sent out by the
Florida school shooter. This is not acceptable. They are spending too much
time trying to prove Russian collusion with the Trump campaign – there is no
collusion. Get back to the basics and make us all proud!”).
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have required the “Opinion, in writing” from either the Attorney
General or the FBI Director (provided that no law prevents such
an inquiry to an inferior officer) about the FBI’s tips and
reporting process or even demand a weekly summary of
particularly noteworthy tips, undoubtedly a subject related to
the duties of the Department of Justice and FBI.147 Given this
authority, the President cannot hide behind the failings of
individual officers on the ground without at least showing the
steps taken to ensure such informational breakdowns do not
occur. The flow of information, including tips to the FBI, is
expressly within the President’s discretion. The Opinions
Clause says so.
In essence, this vision of accountability in the Constitution’s
text can meet our republican needs while also avoiding the
accretion of power in the executive branch. Even James
Madison, who so strongly supported a vigorous unitary executive
at the convention, and even, much to the Unitary scholars’
delight, voted to vest the president with removal authority in the
Decision of 1789, realized the unchecked potential of the
executive he helped create. In the Neutrality Proclamation and
his losing effort in the fight over executive power with Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison recognized that in his obsession over
the potentially tyrannical legislature, he had created a singular
branch of government that could, in fact, pose a great danger to
the republic.148 In other words, James Madison had made the
inverse of the error he attributed to the early state constitutions
who empowered the legislature at the expense of the executive.
Thankfully, both the Decision of 1789 and the Neutrality
Proclamation are examples of post-Constitution policy debates,
and we will always have the authority to course-correct through
the law.
V. The Functional Opinions Clause: President Washington
and the Three Key Powers
In the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional
Convention, President Washington used the Opinions Clause to
147. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
148. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 375–84.
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aid his efforts to cement the newly formed federal government.
President Washington faced the nation’s first crisis in the
Whiskey Rebellion and used the Opinions Clause to inform
himself and the Congress of the measures that needed to be
taken to quash the rebellion. Part A recounts this story through
the lens of the Opinions Clause, beginning with Washington’s
reports on the need for a militia from Secretary of War Henry
Knox to the opinions from Secretary of Treasury Alexander
Hamilton and Attorney General Edmund Randolph on how to
stop the crisis. Each of the opinions recounted below served the
president’s interests in congress, in the courts, and in popular
opinion. From this story, three key Opinions Clause powers are
inferred for subsequent and future presidents. These powers are
outlined in Part B. The first power is the Unitary Political Tool,
which allows the president to use opinions from the cabinet to
further political and legislative goals both in congress and with
the American people. The second power, the Unitary Judiciary
Tool, enables the president to defend executive actions or take
offensive actions in court. Finally, the third power is the Unitary
Executive Tool, which is a recognition that the Opinions Clause
allows the president to unite the executive into a coherent,
uniform and law-abiding branch.
A. President George Washington, the Whiskey Rebellion,
and the Complete Picture of the Opinions Clause
At the founding of our republic, President George
Washington understood the role and the powers of the
Presidency provided by the Opinions Clause. Before the First
Congress designed the executive branch, Washington availed
himself of the expertise of the acting department heads left over
from the Continental Congress.149 As Professors Calabresi and
Yoo highlight, President Washington consistently asked the first
principal officers for written reports of their respective
departments to acquaint himself of the country’s situation.150
149. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 40–41 (Yale
Univ. Press 2008).
150. Id. (“A mere five days after Washington’s inauguration, he asked
Acting Secretary of War Henry Knox to examine and provide a summary report
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Gradually, these communications turned to asking the cabinet
for their opinions on the policies and the constitutionality of
proposed acts by Congress.151
President Washington’s
correspondence with his Cabinet reveals a pattern of the
presidency textually depicted in the Opinions Clause: the
president requires the principal officers to report to him, and
then, after careful consideration of their opinions, he takes the
action authorized by law. In particular, the Opinions Clause
enabled each of President Washington’s actions in crushing the
Whiskey Rebellion, a seminal moment establishing the strength
and longevity of the newly-created federal government.152 Most
importantly, each of these actions show that the Opinions Power
provides the president with a unitary legislative and political
tool, judicial tool, and executive tool as described in Part B
below.
The story of President Washington’s Opinions-enabled
victory over the Whiskey Rebellion begins in 1789 with his effort
to get Congress to legalize the militia under the new
Constitution. In this example, we see the Opinions Clause
acting as a unitary legislative tool for the President, arming him
with evidence and opinions that he uses to get his agenda
on papers regarding a treaty with the Cherokee Indians that he was
forwarding to Knox. A little more than a month later, Washington asked the
Board of the Treasury, the acting postmaster general, and the acting
secretaries of war and foreign affairs to prepare a written report that would
provide him with ‘an acquaintance with the real situation of the several great
Departments’ and a ‘full, precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the
United States’ connected with their particular departments.”) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis in original); Letter from George Washington to the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives, supra note 64. Washington went on to
attach the report from Secretary Knox on the treaty with the Cherokee Indians
in his letter to the Senate and the House of Representatives on August 7, 1789.
Id. Washington writes to Congress that he thinks it “proper to suggest the
consideration of the expediency of instituting a temporary Commission for [the
purpose of negotiating a treaty], to consist of three persons, whose authority
should expire with the occasion.” Id.
151. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 149, at 41 (showing that Washington
recognizes the link between the Opinions Power and the legislative role of the
Presidency, particularly with respect to the Veto Power). The President seeks
the advice of his Cabinet on the constitutionality and policy considerations in
acts of Congress, giving him ammunition to file his “Objections” should he
decide to veto. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
152. See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s
Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567 (1972).
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through Congress.153
On August 10, 1789, President
Washington directed a report to Congress on the status of the
troops left over from the Continental Congress, adding his
opinion on the continued importance of the troops to protecting
the nation.154 Through this policy position, he urged Congress
to legalize the militia under the new Constitution and to grant
him a procedure for calling these troops into action.155
Perhaps disheartened by Congress’s delay, President
Washington sent Secretary of War Henry Knox a letter
containing initial plans for a nationalized militia, and asked
Secretary Knox to report back with a detailed proposal for
Congress to consider.156 A month later, on January 18, 1790,
Secretary Knox sent President Washington his “plan for the
arrangement of the militia of the United States,” along with his
recommendation that the “events . . . require that the
government should possess a strong corrective arm.”157 To be
clear, this correspondence between President Washington and
his principal officer is the incarnation of the text of the Opinions
Clause. President Washington required the opinion of Secretary
Knox, who then fulfilled his duty to supply that opinion.158 Then,
three days later, President Washington wrote to Congress with
his own opinion that creating a national militia was “of the
highest importance to the welfare of our Country,” and sent
Congress the detailed plan devised by Secretary Knox for
Congress to consider.159 Still frustrated, President Washington
reminded Congress of these previous communications and the
importance of the militia in his 1791 address to Congress.160
153. See infra Part V(B)(I).
154. Letter from George Washington, U.S. President to the U.S. Senate
and House of Representatives (Aug. 10, 1789), https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-03-02-0251-0001#.
155. Id.
156. George Washington, Diary Entry (Dec. 19, 1789), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-05-02-0005-0004-0019.
157. Letter from Henry Knox, U.S. Secretary, Dep’t of War, to George
Washington, U.S. President (Jan. 18, 1790), http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-05-02-0009.
158. Id.
159. Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate
&
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Jan.
21,
1790),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0020.
160. See generally Letter from George Washington, U.S. President to the
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Finally, on May 2, 1792, Congress gave President Washington
what he wanted: the 1792 Militia Act vested President
Washington with the emergency power to call the militia into
action provided that Congress was on recess and that a federal
judge certified that control of the situation was beyond the
judiciary’s capabilities.161 Again, the Opinions Clause provided
President Washington with the authority to inform himself, and
then use that information as evidence to push his agenda
through Congress—an early example of a president using Article
II’s unitary legislative tool.
As the Whiskey Rebellion heightened, President
Washington utilized the Opinions Clause to collect diverse and
at times contentious advice from his Cabinet and then formed a
unitary executive policy that the administration acted on.162 On
August 2, 1794, President Washington and his Cabinet met with
officers from the state of Pennsylvania in an effort to inform
them of the situation facing the federal government and to enlist
their help in response.163 In this meeting, President Washington
presented the Pennsylvanians with communications from
officers on the ground in Western Pennsylvania to Secretary of
Treasury Alexander Hamilton and Secretary Knox.164 These
papers and this meeting support both a key potential power and
an important reading of the Opinions Clause. First, the
President used the opinions and reports from the executive
branch in an attempt to build political support.165 Although the
Pennsylvania officials are not what we may think of as the
People, the end goal is the same: President Washington wanted
a politically palatable method to achieve his policy of quashing
the rebellion and collecting the excise tax. Second, these papers
reinforce the hierarchy contemplated by the Opinions Clause,
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives (Oct. 25, 1791), https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-09-02-0062.
161. See Kohn, supra note 152, at 572; see also Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28,
1 Stat. 264, 264–65 (1792).
162. See infra Part V(B)(3).
163.
See Conference Concerning the Insurrection in Western
Pennsylvania, [2 August 1794], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0009 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2018).
164. Id. at n. 3–8.
165. See infra Part I(B).
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namely that a president need not reach into the inferior and civil
officers in the individual departments, but instead can gather
the information through the filter of his principal officers.166
While there was no statute preventing President Washington
from communicating directly with the officers who wrote to
Secretaries Knox and Hamilton, if such a statute did exist, as is
contemplated in the discussion below around President
Trump,167 President Washington still would have been able to
carry out his plan in this meeting.
Unfortunately, President Washington, in the meeting with
the Pennsylvania state officials, failed to garner enough political
and actual support from the state government, thus leaving him
to consider any and all options available to the federal
government.168 Within a few days of the meeting, Secretary
Hamilton reported to President Washington the entire factual
history of the Whiskey Rebellion as it was known to the federal
government.169 This detailed report reinforces the hierarchy
contemplated by the Opinions Clause, as each of the factual
assertions come from communications by the inferior officers to
Secretary Hamilton.170 In a later letter, Secretary Hamilton
wrote to Washington that it would be politically advantageous
to release this detailed factual report to the citizens at large.171
Two days later, President Washington submitted Secretary
Hamilton’s factual report to Attorney General Edmund
Randolph, seeking his opinion on the merits of releasing the

166. See infra Part III(B)(2) (this hierarchy refers to the negative
implication analysis).
167. See infra Part VI(B).
168. See Kohn, supra note 152.
169. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
to George Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 5, 1794), http://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0357.
170. Id. (“The reality of the danger to the Deputy was countenanced by
the Opinion of General Neville, the Inspector of the Revenue, a man who before
had given and since has given numerous proofs of a steady and firm temper.
And what followed, as announced in a letter of that Officer of the 27th of
October 1791, is a further Confirmation of it.” (footnote omitted)). Hamilton’s
opinion to Washington contains numerous references to correspondence from
Inspector Neville, an inferior officer reporting to Hamilton. Id.
171. Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, to
George Washington, U.S. President (Aug. 16, 1794), http://founders.archives.
gov /documents/Washington/05-16-02-0387.
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report to the people.172 Attorney General Randolph cautioned
President Washington on the optics of naming names, and,
remarkably, even suggested that Secretary Hamilton may be
picking and choosing his targets based on personal rivalries.173
Here, President Washington relied on two of the Opinions
Clause’s powers outlined below in Part B. He attempted to unify
the executive branch’s message on the best way to respond to
Pennsylvania’s intransigence and the Whiskey Rebellion,
essentially cross-checking the Secretary of Treasury’s wishes
with the opinion of the Attorney General.174 Additionally,
President Washington quite amazingly used the Opinions
Clause to solicit the advice from two of his principal officers
about the merits of one of the Opinions Clause’s key uses:
releasing an opinion to garner political support from the
people.175 Secretary Hamilton was chomping at the bit to name
and shame the rebels, while General Randolph suggested this
may backfire politically.176
On this debate, President
Washington leaned towards Attorney General Randolph,
sending commissioners to the region to appear politically
cautious while he also began to ready the militia.177
President Washington also effectively utilized the Opinions
Power as a tool for engaging in confrontations with the
judiciary.178 In the days immediately following the meeting,
President Washington asked his principal officers to “give, in
[w]riting, their opinion on the measure[s] proper to be pursued
by the [e]xecutive.”179 Secretary Knox, in response, reminded
172. See Letter from Edmund Randolph, U.S. Sec. of State, to George
Washington,
U.S.
President
(Aug.
18,
1794),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0395.
173. Id. (“The specifying of names in the third page, and the omission of
all names, except Cannon and Gallatin . . . will be interpreted into a kind of
warfare waged by the President against individuals in the former case, and a
desire of selecting for odium Gallatin, whose hostility against the Secretary of
the treasury is well known.”).
174. See infra Part V(B)(3) (Unitary Executive Tool).
175. See infra Part V(B)(1) (Unitary Political Tool).
176. See Kohn, supra note 152, at 574–75.
177. Id.
178. See infra Part V(B)(2) (Unitary Judicial Tool).
179. Letter from Henry Knox, U.S. Sec. of War, to George Washington,
U.S. President (Aug. 4, 1794), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/05-16-02-0354. It should be noted that the request mirrors the
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the President of the statutory test laid out in the Militia Act of
1792: he had to convince a federal judge that restoring order to
the region was beyond the “ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.”180 Thus, Secretary Knox presented the evidence
submitted to him by the inferior officers, particularly Thomas
Butler and Isaac Craig, who described the lawless state of the
area and the violence inflicted on the Inspector of the Revenue’s
home.181 As a result of this communication from his inferior
officers, Secretary Knox offered President Washington his
opinion on the militia force that may be required, provided the
President got the certification from the federal judge.182
President Washington gathered this information laid out by
his Cabinet and submitted it as evidence to Justice James
Wilson, seeking the certification required by the Militia Act of
1792.183 In response, Justice Wilson issued the order stating
that the insurrection was too powerful “to be suppressed by the
ordinary Course of judicial Proceedings, or by the Powers vested
in the Marshal of that District.”184 More importantly for our
purposes, Justice Wilson expressly based this decision on the
“[e]vidence, which has been laid before me.”185 Here, President
Washington effectively used the Opinions Power to produce
evidence submitted to a court, and it was that evidence that
allowed him to further his policy goal. Additionally, this
text of the Opinions Clause itself. President Washington often mirrored the
Constitution’s text in his letter without explicitly citing a particular clause.
See also Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S. Senate &
U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 8, 1790), https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-04-02-0361 (reporting what is “necessary to convey
to you that information of the state of the Union, which it is my duty to afford”).
It is inferred from President Washington’s use of the exact same language that
he was citing the constitutional clause in question; in the case for this article,
the Opinions Clause.
180. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 179.
181. Id. at n.3.
182. Id. “[T]he Opinion is submitted that good consequences will arise
from having even a super abundant force. The interests of humanity and good
order will be combined by preventing the deluded people from entertaining
hopes of a successful resistance. The power of the Government to execute the
laws will be demonstrated both at home and abroad.” Id. (explaining that Knox
would also provide an accounting of militias and equipment of the
Pennsylvania and the surrounding states).
183. Id. at n.4.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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particular episode highlights that President Washington obeyed
the law as it was passed by Congress. He did not base his actions
on a protective power or other non-textual executive power
inherent in the Constitution. The Congress placed a limit on the
President’s authority over the militia, and he used the Opinions
Clause to comply with it.
In sum, President Washington achieved a great victory for
his administration and for the early survival of the federal
government through the intended use of the Opinions Clause.
He convinced Congress to pass a law authorizing his use of the
militia, arming himself with the opinion of the Secretary of War
on the status and need for such a militia. He united the
executive branch, settling differences in opinion and ensuring
that he acted only after having the best advice. He then followed
the congressional mandate in the Militia Act of 1792 and used
the opinions as evidence to convince Justice Wilson to certify the
need to call the militia into action. He even contemplated the
political pros and cons of potentially releasing his Cabinet’s
opinions to the American people. Importantly, he did not need
to reach into the executive departments and communicate
directly with the inferior officers, instead he relied on the filter
and the expertise of his principal Officers. In the end, the
administration successfully crushed the rebellion.186

186. See Letter from George Washington, U.S. President, to the U.S.
Senate & U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 19, 1794, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-17-02-0125. As mandated by law,
President Washington reported his success to the next session of Congress in
his State of the Union, and requested they authorize the continued presence of
troops in the region. Interestingly, President Washington did not rely on his
executive power to unilaterally keep the militia in Western Pennsylvania. Id.
Rather, he used the information provided to him by his Cabinet Secretaries to
request Congress grant him a continuing authorization. Id. On the one hand,
the Opinions Power armed President Washington with the evidence to
convince Congress. Id. On the other hand, the limited reading of executive
power allowed Congress to debate the merits of the standing militia, providing
a check on the President’s agenda. Id. Just ten days after the President’s State
of the Union, the Third Congress passed a continuing authorization statute for
the militia in Western Pennsylvania, perfectly illustrating the strength of the
Opinions Power for a politically skilled President. Id.; see also Act of Nov. 29,
1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 403, 403 (1794).
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B. Don’t Fret: The Unitary Executive Powers Vested by the
Opinions Clause
As detailed above, President Washington made extensive
use of the power vested in him by the Opinions Clause, requiring
his cabinet to report advice to him and then using that advice to
take action on behalf of the country.187 From President
Washington’s actions on the Whiskey Rebellion, there are three
potential uses of the Opinions Clause: The Unitary Political
Tool,188 The Unitary Judicial Tool,189 and The Unitary Executive
Tool.190 This Section focuses on these three particular powers,
expanding on both recent examples and potential uses. Both the
political and judicial tools cover the president’s relationship with
the two other co-equal branches of government. The Unitary
Executive Tool represents the president’s unitary authority over
the executive branch, with the Opinions Power enabling him to
unite his agenda, exercise or support for-cause removals, and to
force independent agencies to justify their actions. Importantly,
each of these potential powers vested in the president under the
Opinions Clause is vested in the president alone, and thus this
article will call them “unitary” powers.
1. Unitary Political Tool
As Professors Amar and Prakash have stated, the Opinions
Clause vests the president with the unique authority vis-à-vis
the other branches over information in the executive branch.191
In this sense, the Clause establishes the president as a chief
information officer, one who will never be denied advice or
opinions.192 The president can use this advantage in political
fights, both by taking such opinions or reports to the congress to
push his legislative agenda, or, if congress fails to respond,
taking the opinions to the people to vote the bums out.
187. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 149, at 40–41.
188. See infra Part V(B)(1).
189. See infra Part V(B)(2).
190. See infra Part V(B)(3).
191. See Amar, supra note 10, at 658–59; Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005.
192. But cf. Prakash, supra note 13, at 991–92 (describing the “Chief
Administrator” theory).
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The history of the proposal at the convention supports this
vision of a president as a legislative leader. The original
proposal included the chief justice, who would “from time to time
recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the
U. S. [sic] as may in his opinion be necessary to the due
administration of [j]ustice, and such as may promote useful
learning and inculcate sound morality.”193 Quite obviously, the
framers contemplated that the Opinions Clause would give the
president the weaponry with which to engage in legislative
fights. As stated above, the framers so wanted the president to
have this confidence that they nearly united the president and
the chief justice, contravening the separation of powers norm.194
By removing this passage from the final Opinions Clause, the
Committee of Eleven appears to have made the judgment call
that advisory opinions and the political involvement of the
judiciary would outweigh the benefits given to the stronger
Presidency.195 Still, they accomplished their original goal: the
Opinions Clause vests the president with the power to utilize the
vast scope of the executive branch to make his case to the
congress or the people. Several examples are provided below.
Because this article also argues for the Opinions Clause’s
negative implications for the executive power, it’s important to
analyze the value of the Opinions Clause in situations where the
president does not have unilateral or unrestricted authority. To
best illustrate the Opinions Clause as a strong political tool,
hypotheticals in which the president must go through congress
to achieve his ultimate policy objective are explored, supra.
Early in his administration, President Trump issued an
executive order seeking to prevent sanctuary cities from
receiving federal grants.196 In County of Santa Clara v. Trump,
the District Court found that the executive order violated
separation of powers principles, the President’s duty under the
Take Care Clause, and the Spending Clause.197 While the

193. FARRAND, supra note 68, at 342–43.
194. Id.; see also supra Part IV(B).
195. See supra Part IV(A); Prakash, supra note 13, at 1005–06 (referring
to the complete timeline).
196. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, § 9(a) (Jan. 25, 2017).
197. 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017), remanded by City & Cty. of
S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Trump administration has appealed this decision, this analysis
will continue under the assumption that such unilateral
executive action is unconstitutional. Additionally, this article
will posit that the intended action fits within the constitutional
framework of the Spending Power established in South Dakota
v. Dole and NFIB v. Sebelius, namely that congress can condition
some federal funds on state actions so long as the sum is not so
great so as to be coercive.198 In other words, this analysis
assumes that the only limitation on the president’s desired
action is the separation of powers: the conditions must originate
in congress.
Despite these constitutional restrictions, President Trump
need not halt his effort to defund sanctuary cities—he only needs
to follow his constitutional role. If issuing an executive order
threatening the removal of federal funds on the city’s failure to
enforce federal immigration laws is invalid because Congress
has the power of the purse, then the President should turn to
Congress. Here, the Opinions Clause would help the President
make his case to the Congress, and if they fail to act, to the
American people.
The President should use the same
justification given for the executive order in the first place:
Sanctuary Jurisdictions supposedly place their citizens at
greater risk for violent crime.199
At an event in Miami, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
commended Miami-Dade County for complying with federal
immigration laws before he chastised Chicago for, in his opinion,
failing to protect its citizens.200 General Sessions linked
Chicago’s high violent crime-rate in part to its continuing
sanctuary policies.201 He stated broadly that “[e]very year too
many Americans [sic] lives are victimized as a result of
sanctuary city policies whether it be theft, robbery, drugs,
assault, battery, and even murder.”202 Sessions even cited
particular examples, including one of an alien who Chicago twice

198. Compare 483 U.S. 203 (1987), with 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
199. See, e.g., Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on
Sanctuary Policies (Aug. 16, 2017) (transcript https://www.justice.gov/opa
/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-sanctuary-policies).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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refused to turn over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
for DUI arrests ultimately being sent back on the street to kill a
victim.203
President Trump could easily take this opinion from his
principal officer to Congress, demanding that they take action to
impose conditions on federal funds. He could require General
Sessions to further investigate and report the harms of
Sanctuary City policies, citing to crime-statistics in such
jurisdictions. Alternatively, he could require the legal opinion of
the Office of Legal Counsel, or counsel at ICE, to provide legal
basis for federal action. Either way, the President could use the
bully-pulpit to build political pressure on the Congress. If highprofile crimes committed by aliens in sanctuary cities make the
news, the ball would have been placed in Congress’ hands, and
they could take the political heat. If the President remains
dissatisfied with congressional inaction, he could take the
opinion to the American people on a campaign tour. He could
inspire his base voters to demand their Congressperson take
appropriate action, and if that doesn’t work, he could demand
and endorse new candidates to oppose incumbent
representatives. This effort would not just be typical campaign
rhetoric, easily dismissed by political opponents. Rather, the
President could deploy the opinion of the nation’s Chief Law
Enforcement Officer—facts and opinions from the person who
knows. At the very least, the President’s political opponents will
need to reply with facts of their own, but they will not have the
luxury of the Opinions Power over the Attorney General.204 In
the end, voters hold their congressperson’s feet to the fire at
election day on an issue that the President has no power over
other than the Opinions Clause. Speaking with a single,
informed voice to the voters, he serves as a republican,
nationally elected check on the factious Congress.
Of course, the Opinions Clause also supports the president’s
veto power, which is vital to the president’s role of a republican

203. Id.
204. They could file a FOIA request, or Congressional opponents could
subpoena documents, but the process and time involved in such a request will
put them at a distinct political disadvantage. These opponents will not have
the same bully pulpit as the President, who will speak with one voice and likely
command the attention of the nation.
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check on the congress.205 In the same manner as his affirmative
legislative proposals, the president may require opinions of his
cabinet to support his vetoing of any legislation passed by
congress. In fact, there is a textual link between the Veto Clause
in Article I, Section 7 and the Opinions Clause. The Veto Clause
requires the president to return the bill “with his Objections,”
which must be noted by the originating house of congress.206 The
opinion given by the principal Officer could either constitute the
entirety of this objection, or it could serve as the basis for the
president’s own policy-based objection. Either way, the veto
clause pictures an informed president, which the Opinions
Clause assures.207
2. Unitary Judicial Tool
The Opinions Clause also vests the president with unique
abilities with respect to challenges in the judicial branch. The
president’s Opinions Power is classified into two different
categories: an offensive power and a defensive power. Under the
offensive power, the president can use opinions to effectuate
policy changes through the Courts, particularly in situations
where he may be up against a binding statute and may not have
a receptive congress.
These opinions take many forms,
including, for example, policy papers, legal opinions, and factual
reports that could be cited by independent parties in challenging
statutes that the president must otherwise enforce. These
opinions, particularly if from the Office of Legal Counsel or the
Attorney General, may also serve as establishing historical legal
precedent, creating formal legal opinions that the Supreme
Court can use as evidence of both historical practice and
constitutional interpretation. Under the defensive power, the
president either preemptively gathers opinions to support the
legality of his actions, or he uses the Opinions Power to gather
205. See supra Part IV(B) (explaining the historical comparison between
the Council of Revision and the Opinions Clause).
206. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
207. See Amar, supra note 10, at 655–56. (explaining that his “coordinacy
principle” states essentially that the Opinions Clause helps the president get
on equal footing with the other branches, particularly the Congress through
the Recommendation Clause, the State of the Union Clause, and the Veto with
Objections Clause).
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evidence to justify past actions being challenged in the courts.
While the offensive Opinions Power may be rarely used, an
analysis of its use shows that it is a potentially important and
untapped reservoir of presidential authority. For a recent highprofile example, President Obama and then Attorney General
Holder decided not to defend the constitutionality of the Defense
of Marriage Act,208 a decision that arguably helped effectuate the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, which
held that the Defense of Marriage Act violated the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by denying samesex marriages federal benefits available to other legally-married
couples.209 General Holder sent a letter to Speaker of the House
John Boehner stating that while the Department of Justice
would continue to enforce the law, they would no longer defend
it against a constitutional challenge.210
At first blush, this opinion has political and legislative
value. President Obama wins political support from those in
favor of marriage equality211 despite previous instances where
he waivered on the issue.212 Undoubtedly, the letter enables a
national conversation to gain even more steam and traction.213
If the President had a receptive Congress, the letter would help
208. See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says
Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.
nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html.
209. See generally 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
210. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John Boehner,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, on Litigation Involving the
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigationinvolving-defense-marriage-act. By enforcing the law, the Administration
staved off “Take Care” challenges. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
211. See Emily Guskin, Scott Clement, & Darla Cameron, While the
Nation’s Economy Recovered, 6 in 10 Americans Said the Country Was on the
Wrong Track, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/national/obama-legacy/public-opinion-social-change.html
(explaining public polling on same-sex marriage during the Obama presidency,
with 61% approving by 2016).
212. See Hunter Schwarz, Obama’s Latest ‘Evolution’ on Gay Marriage:
He Lied About Opposing It, Axelrod Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/02/10/axelrod-saysobama-lied-about-opposing-gay-marriage-its-another-convenientevolution/?utm_term=.59fdac3cd304.
213. See ROBERTA A. KAPLAN, THEN COMES MARRIAGE: UNITED STATES V.
WINDSOR AND THE DEFEAT OF DOMA (Recorded Books 2015).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/5

58

ARTICLE 5_MURRAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

EXECUTIVE POWER

3/28/2019 2:16 PM

287

snap Congress into action to repeal a law the President deemed
unconstitutional.
But the opinion also serves the president’s interests in
court. In Windsor v. United States, the Plaintiffs cited the
Holder letter in their successful motion for summary judgment,
stating that as the “Attorney General has recognized [there is]
‘a growing scientific consensus [that] accepts that sexual
orientation is a characteristic that is immutable.’”214 The
Plaintiff’s motion also cited General Holder’s opinion that
Congress did not have a sufficient governmental interest to
justify the denial of federal benefits to married same-sex couples
under the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection doctrine.215 It is
quite powerful for the Chief Law Enforcement Officer of the
federal government to state that the federal government does
not have a strong enough interest to meet constitutional
requirements. The Plaintiff not so subtly dropped the weight of
the executive branch’s determination on the trial judge. While
the Trial Judge did not specifically refer to the letter, both she
and the Second Circuit ruled that the statute was
unconstitutional.216
Roberta A. Kaplan, Edith Windsor’s
attorney, recognized the importance of the Holder opinion,
writing that “[i]t is almost impossible to overstate how
important this decision was for our side. . . . It is extremely
unusual for the government to decline to defend federal laws,
especially when doing so might come at a political cost.”217
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional.218 In all, the President used the offensive
power inherent in the Opinions Clause to further a policy goal
in the courts.
In addition to opinions challenging statutes the president
hopes the Court will overturn, the president can also use the
offensive power to generate constitutional interpretations and
historical precedent in situations where the Court may not have

214. Brief of Plaintiff at 18, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12–2335–
cv(L), 12–2435(Con)), 2011 WL 3165327.
215. Id.
216. See Windsor v. U.S., 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699
F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
217. KAPLAN, supra note 213, at 145.
218. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 210.
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a reason to weigh in.219 Perhaps the most prevalent exercise of
this power is the Office of Legal Counsel, which issues memos
and opinions on the legality of executive branch actions.220
Through these opinions, the president can build on the opinions
of past administrations and develop a precedent of legal
interpretation benefitting the office of the presidency. Although
Courts do not consider OLC opinions binding authority, Sonia
Mittal documents their role as persuasive authority of an
historical practice, thus serving as gap-fillers in cases not yet
settled by the Court.221 To illustrate, the Court in Noel Canning
v. NLRB adopted a broad interpretation of the Vacancy
Appointments Clause based on the historical practice and
balance reached by the political branches. In so doing, the Court
cited opinions from past Attorneys General and OLCs
authorizing such broad vacancy appointments,222 giving
significant evidentiary effect to these opinions.
From a big picture perspective, the Court’s deference to
these legal opinions written for presidents essentially cedes a
portion of constitutional interpretation to the executive branch
at the expense of both the judiciary and the congress. The Court
posited two separate readings of the Vacancy Appointments
Clause, a narrow, restrictive reading and a broad reading.
219. See Sonia Mittal, OLC’s Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the
Office of Legal Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2015); see also, John O.
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A
Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375,
376 (1993) (“many of the opinions are the final word on the law because judicial
resolution of the legal issue is unavailable”).
220. Mittal, supra note 219, at 212. First, we should briefly summarize
the role these opinions play within the executive branch. As Sonia Mittal
points out, OLC memos serve as the legal authority for actions taken within
the executive branch. Id. Oftentimes, this role requires the OLC to “resolve
legal disputes between expert agencies,” thus serving as a unifying tool for the
executive branch. Id. (emphasis in original). If the President finds that two of
the expert agencies are in dispute, he can direct the Attorney General to
require an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel. Id. In this sense, the
Opinions Clause is a power the President may use to unify the executive
branch’s actions, even if he does not have the binding directive power over all
of these agencies.
221. Id. at 218–19.
222. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2562 (2014) (stating “[n]ot
surprisingly, the publicly available opinions of Presidential legal advisers that
we have found are nearly unanimous in determining that the Clause
authorizes these appointments”).
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Unsurprisingly, presidents and their attorneys general wanted
the broad readings of their own power, so they issued opinions
calling this a settled question.223 This particular case highlights
how the unitary Opinions Clause gives the president a unique
power to influence the Constitution through historical practices.
The Court emphasized that the Senate has never taken any
formal action to rebuke or contest the executive branch’s
constitutional interpretation, but it acknowledged several
occasions where individual senators and senate committees
disagreed.224 On the other hand, the Court considered each
individual opinion issued by an Attorney General or an Office of
Legal Counsel to be formal enough to give it interpretive weight.
In other words, the president’s request for an opinion from the
OLC is a formal action interpreting the Constitution, whereas
an individual senator’s or even senate committee’s statement is
not given the same weight. This imbalance gives the president
a unique advantage based on the unitary power of the Opinions
Clause. The president can simply exercise the enumerated
Opinions Power to generate legal opinions that could over time
establish constitutional precedent.
Furthermore, the Opinions Clause provides an effective
defensive power for the president, allowing the president to
gather written evidence to defend certain actions and achieve
results in the courts. One example of this defensive power is
illustrated by the case challenging the Obama Administration’s
designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi on the Central Intelligence
Agency’s alleged kill list.225 To defend the action brought by AlAulaqi’s father, the United States cited a public declaration from
then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, detailing
factual findings of Al-Aulaqi.226 The District Court then
dismissed the case, citing the Clapper opinion as evidence that
Al-Aulaqi was able to come to the U.S. and challenge his status
in court, but that he had no intention of doing so, precluding the
223. Id. at 2571 (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 2571–72.
225. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010).
226. Brief of Defendant at 1, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-1469(JDB)), 2010 WL 3863135 (stating that Al-Aulaqi
was a leader of AQAP, setting strategies and directing terrorist attacks against
the United States, including the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines
flight in 2009).
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father from asserting next friend standing.227
Although
President Obama may not have directly requested this opinion
from DNI Clapper, this example shows the kind of opinion a
president could require and then deploy defensively in litigation.
As an additional hypothetical, President Obama could have
required a report from the Secretary of Homeland Security on
the need to set priorities for enforcement in advance of the DAPA
case—Texas v. U.S.228 The president could then release this
opinion to the DOJ to use in defending the actions as valid and
legitimate enforcement discretion delegated to the president and
the Department of Homeland Security by law. Such facts on the
ground might convince the Court that the actions are far more
discretionary than they are actually suspending or rewriting the
law. As these examples illustrate, the president can use the
Opinions Clause to generate evidence to defend his policies and
actions in court.
These two examples represent the power to generate
evidence, but, recently, the Trump administration used the
Opinions Clause to legitimate and give constitutional cover for
otherwise corrupt motives. At oral argument in Trump v.
Hawaii, the Trump administration argued that the Supreme
Court should not consider Trump’s anti-Muslim campaign
statements in considering whether the travel ban was motivated
by religious animus, in violation of the First Amendment.229 To
justify this argument, the Government cited the Opinions
Clause as a constitutional moment, transforming President
Trump’s biased campaign opinions into presidential
proclamations supported by the expert opinions of his
Cabinet.230 In fact, Solicitor General Noel Francisco opened his
227. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
228. See generally 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
229. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17965).
230. Id. at 29 (stating “we are very much of the view that campaign
statements are made by a private citizen before he takes the oath of office and
before, under the Opinions Clause of the Constitution, receives the advice of
his cabinet, and that those are constitutionally significant acts that mark the
fundamental transformation from being a private citizen to the embodiment of
the executive branch”). This argument is consistent with this article’s view of
executive power, as it’s the oath that transforms Citizen Trump into President
Trump—a Section One clause “naming” the President. Then, President Trump
exercises his Section Two power—the Opinions Clause—to support his
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argument by describing the detailed multi-agency review,
framing the case as the President merely adopting the
Homeland Security Secretary’s recommendations.231 Here, the
Trump administration introduces a new formulation of the
Opinions Clause’s defensive power: Imbuing constitutionally
questionable acts with the legitimate cover of expertise.232
3. Unitary Executive Tool: For Cause Removal and
Independent Agencies
Perhaps most importantly for the broader debate over the
executive power, the Opinions Clause grants the president with
strong authority to unify the executive branch. The Clause
enables the president to design a coherent and unified
enforcement and regulatory agenda. The president can also use
opinions he obtains under the Opinions Clause power as cause
to remove even the most independent officers, or, at the very
least, ensure that even the most independent agency is held
accountable to the American people through their opinions.
Again, because negative implications are inferred for the
Vesting Clause and the broader executive power from the
Opinions Clause, these powers are intentionally analyzed with
respect to the unitary scholars’ worst nightmare: an
independent agency. Here, it is assumed that an independent
agency is one where the director(s) cannot be removed at will by
the president, and, as discussed above, the president may not
direct specific action. If the agency is headed by an inferior
officer, then one can also assume congress barred the president
from requiring the inferior officer report directly to him. Still,
this inferior officer will be subject to a principal officer’s duties
for purposes of the Opinions Clause.233
To begin, the Opinions Clause provides the president a tool
proclamation, which the Government argues is authorized by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(f)). See id.
231. Id. at 3.
232. Ironically, the Trump administration uses the Opinions Clause to
hide behind his cabinet—the exact opposite reading that Professor Prakash
and framer James Iredell stated. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
233. The Opinions Clause grants the president the power to require the
principal officer report to him “upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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to shape a coherent regulatory agenda.234 Even if a president
cannot direct an agency to take a certain action, the president is
at least guaranteed the ability to know that such an action is
about to be taken. As has been argued in the past, this
procedural power allows the president to prepare the agencies
he can direct to react and adapt to the incoming regime.235 If the
particular policy enacted by the independent agency is
particularly egregious, the president can seek to mitigate the
harms elsewhere. For instance, if the EPA236 issues a new
regulation under § 402 of the Clean Water Act creating more
stringent requirements for permits, the president could seek to
ease the regulatory burden on businesses by instructing the
Army Corps of Engineers to ease its regulatory authority over
§ 404 permits under the same Act.237
As explained above, the Office of Legal Counsel serves this
unifying role for the president and the executive branch writ
large. The OLC steps in to resolve disputes between two
competing agencies, delivering an opinion to the agency or the
attorney general regarding the legal victor.238 The president
could take a more active role in this process, particularly if the
two competing agencies included an independent agency over
which he had little control. The president would have two
procedural options to resolve these disputes. First, he can either
require the opinion in writing from the officers of the individual
agencies about the legality of their work, and they in turn can
submit the request to the Office of Legal Counsel. Or, second,
the president could make the request directly to the Office of
Legal Counsel (or through the Attorney General).239 Either way,
234. See Sunstein & Strauss, supra note 31, at 200 (classifying the
Opinions Clause as a procedural power allowing the President to consult and
coordinate with the departments).
235. Id.
236. This hypothetical assumes, of course, that Congress has insulated
the EPA from presidential authority.
237. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 44 (2012) (explaining that under the Clean
Water Act, the EPA has authority for 402 permits issued to point sources, while
the Army Corps of Engineers has authority over 404 permits for dredged or
fill-material).
238. See Mittal, supra note 219, at 212.
239. See id.; see also Committee on Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.C.C. 2008). For the Office of
Legal Counsel, the Attorney General serving as a buffer may be very
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the Opinions Clause guarantees the president a constitutional
power to settle disputes between actors in the vast executive
branch.
More importantly, the Opinions Clause vests the president
with the more classical executive powers. It provides the
president with a backstop for the power to remove the
independent officer: it is an opportunity to show cause. One can
foresee two potential procedures congress could layout to protect
an executive branch official. One, congress could grant the
executive branch official the power to appeal the decision to an
Article III court, requiring the executive branch to show cause.240
Or, two, congress could require the president receive senate or
congressional approval for the removal of the officer.241 In either
instance, the president will be able to use the opinion as evidence
of cause for removal. As Professor Sidak pointed out, the refusal
to give such an opinion would automatically provide cause for
removal, as the individual officer would be violating their oath
important. Much has been made since the infamous “Torture Memo” about the
impartiality of the Office of Legal Counsel and whether it is just a “rubber
stamp.” Mittal, supra note 219, at 212. Direct presidential involvement in the
OLC’s decision-making process may exacerbate this problem, as the OLC may
feel the pressure to approve the President’s actions when the request comes
from the President. These concerns were not unfamiliar to the framers; at the
North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell stated that the Opinions
Clause would guard against President’s colluding with executive officers to
corrupt their opinions, chiefly by having it in writing. See ELLIOT, supra note
54 at 108–10.
Additionally, early in our nation’s history, President
Washington and the Senate considered the proper forum for deliberations over
the treaty-making process. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The two
parties acknowledged that both branches would be harmed by having the
President present for the debate on the Treaty: the President may be
embarrassed by the rejection of his proposal, and the Senate may be tempered
in its deliberation in the presence of the powerful office. Id. Likewise, the
OLC, like all executive officials, may feel the same political pressure over its
deliberation.
240. See Tara Golshan, What Republicans in Congress Say About Passing
a Bill to Protect Robert Mueller, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.vox.
com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/29/17164408/constitutional-protecting-robertmueller-job-congress (explaining that this limitation is currently being
contemplated by the proposed legislation to insulate Special Counsel Robert
Mueller from President Trump’s removal authority).
241. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing senate
advice and consent as the default practice for the displacement of executive
officials and, although arguably wrong, this shows there was a greater deal of
ambiguity over the removal power than the unitary scholars would like to
admit).
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of office.242 Assuming the officer writes the opinion, the
president can use it as evidence for cause, particularly if there
are false statements, incorrect statements of law, evidence that
the agency is not following the law, or potentially even the
president’s evaluation of the opinion and the officer’s abilities.243
Admittedly, this removal-by-bad-opinion authority is
weaker than the unitary scholars envision, but it recognizes the
textual fact that the Take Care Clause imposes the duty on the
president to see that the laws are faithfully executed.244
Removing an officer who is protected by law and who is faithfully
executing the laws passed by congress violates the president’s
constitutional duty. Thus, this forceful reading of the Opinions
Clause and its implications for a more limited reading of
executive power again reconciles Article II’s structure. The
president expressly has the Opinions Power while expressly
having the Take Care duty. By tying removal under restrictive
laws to the president’s express constitutional power, we
maintain the logic behind Article II. If the executive branch is
following and enforcing the law, how can the president be said
to uphold his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed if he removes a law-abiding officer who has not violated
their duty?
Still, this restricted reading of the executive power through
the Opinions Clause does not render the president completely
powerless. In fact, as detailed in the legislative section above,
the Opinions Clause vests the president with a great political
tool that he can use to instill executive accountability that may
be lost through restricted removal. Again, assuming the most
independent agency, the president will still have the authority
to get any and all information about the duties of the executive
branch. Thus, the president will be able to apprise himself of
the independent agencies proposed actions, current actions, and
past policy directives. He could even require the other agencies

242. Sidak, supra note 57, at 2087 (stating “the President can remove
those who produce faulty or injudicious opinions”).
243. This last element is obviously quite subjective and could be an
exception that swallows the rule. But there are no rigid rules here, and the
President will only be bound by their ability to convince whichever body is
charged with providing the procedural check.
244. U.S. CONST. art. II § 3, cl. 5.
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to report their opinions on the impacts on their fields of the
independent agency’s activity. The president can then use these
opinions and go to congress or the American people to make the
political case against the independent agency.
For instance, President Trump may have sympathetic ears
in his base for arguments against the independent Consumer
Finance Protection Bureau.245
Under this vision of the
Presidency, President Trump could require the CFPB to provide
him with their opinions and reports on all of their proposed and
current activity. President Trump then takes these opinions and
reports to the American people on a cross-country tour against
the overreaching and liberty-infringing CFPB, rallying his base
to the point where they hold as a litmus test for potential
candidates for Congress whether they support eliminating the
CFPB or subjecting it to plenary presidential discretion.246 In
the end, the President can force an independent agency to sell
their every move to any audience the President can muster,
including the American people as a whole. If the President
cannot make this case through the American people, then the
law should not change as a constitutional matter. The
constitutional system and its intended accountability has
worked—the President provided a republican check on the
potentially overreaching Congress by speaking with a singular
voice to the American people about the evils of an independent
CFPB. The CFPB essentially had to convince the American
people that it adds value to our government. Also, Congress’s
previous decision to insulate the CFPB’s mission and mandate
from politically motivated direction was not violated. Through
this vision, executive branch accountability, republican checks
on Congress, and Congress’s power to make the laws as
representatives of the people were all upheld. By contrast,
reading plenary removal power into the Presidency not only
contradicts the text of the Constitution, but it would contradict
the individual policy decisions made by the people’s
representatives in Congress.
245. See, e.g., Diane Katz, The CFPB in Action: Consumer Bureau Harms
Those It Claims to Protect, BACKGROUNDER, no. 2760, Jan. 22, 2013,
https://www.heritage.org/housing/report/the-cfpb-action-consumer-bureauharms-those-it-claims-protect.
246. See supra Part IV(B)(1).
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VI. The Current Opinions Clause: President Trump and the
Independence of Law Enforcement
The Opinions Clause interpreted in this article has
important implications for the current debate over the meaning
of executive power. Without question, President Trump, in his
interactions with former FBI Director James Comey, has
sparked a debate over the proper role of the President with
respect to the ideal of independent and apolitical law
enforcement.247 This section analyzes President Trump’s firing
of James Comey as a failed attempt at the proper use of the
Opinions Clause and discusses President Trump’s interactions
with Director Comey and U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara, two
inferior officers, including how those interactions contradict the
longstanding norms of the Justice Department. Both of these
discussions compare President Trump to President Washington,
whose expert use of the Opinions Clause serves as a useful
contrast. Finally, Part B outlines the legislative steps congress
could take in light of the negative implications of the Opinions
Clause to limit future presidential overreach with respect to the
Department of Justice.
A. President Trump, the Failed Attempt at the Opinions
Power and Presidential Overreach
President Trump exercised the Opinions Power in his
decision to remove FBI Director James Comey. Deputy Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein testified to the Senate Judiciary
Committee that President Trump sought his “advice and
input”248 on the decision to remove FBI Director Comey.249
247. Compare Jack Goldsmith, Independence and Accountability at the
Department of Justice, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018, 2:16 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/independence-and-accountability-departmentjustice, with Robert Litt, FBI Independence—Too Much of a Good Thing?,
LAWFARE BLOG (July 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fbiindependence%E2%80%94too-much-good-thing.
248. Rod J. Rosenstein, U.S. Deputy Att. Gen., Briefing for the Members
of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, 2 (May 18–19, 2017)
(transcript
available
at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3727183/Untitleddocument.pdf).
249. See Transcript: Jeff Sessions’ Testimony on Trump and Russia,
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Rosenstein’s memo to the Attorney General stated that the FBI
needed new leadership based on his disagreement with the
actions taken by Director Comey during the investigation into
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.250 Then, following the
Unitary Executive Tool outlined above, President Trump
attached the opinion from Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein
as adopted by Attorney General Sessions to his letter to Director
Comey, stating that he had “accepted their recommendation”
and that Comey was “hereby terminated and removed from
office, effective immediately.”251 President Trump also used
these opinions as a unitary political tool—releasing Rosenstein’s
memo in the hopes that it would give him the political cover for
firing Director Comey.252
In sum, President Trump seemingly showed expertise in his
use of the Opinions Power in the immediate time of the firing of

POLITICO (June 13, 2017, 7:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/13/
full-text-jeff-session-trump-russia-testimony-239503. It’s unclear whether
President Trump went directly to the Deputy Attorney General, an inferior
officer, or instead went through the Attorney General. We know that the
President asked Attorney General Jeff Sessions for his recommendation, and
that Rosenstein sent the memo to the Attorney General, who then adopted the
recommendations and submitted them to the President. Id. These facts
suggest that the President followed the Opinions Clause hierarchy and went
through the principal officer. Either way, there is no law on the books
restricting the President’s Opinions Power over DOJ inferior officers.
However, even if there was such a law, the President would still have been able
to gather the Department’s recommendations through the principal officer,
Attorney General Jeff Sessions.
250. Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the
Attorney General, Restoring Public Confidence in the FBI (May 9, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/rosenstein-letterannotated/526116/.
251. See William Cummings, Full Text of Trump’s Letter Telling Comey
He’s Fired, USA TODAY (May 9, 2017, 9:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/05/09/full-text-trump-letter-comeyfiring/101491982/; Letter from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., to Donald Trump,
U.S. President (May 9, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
onpolitics/2017/05/09/full-text-trump-letter-comey-firing/101491982/
(concurring in Rosenstein’s judgment); see also supra Part IV(B)(3) for
discussion on the Unitary Executive Tool.
252. See Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, Trump Shifts Rationale for
Firing Comey, Calling Him a ‘Showboat,’ N.Y. TIMES, (May 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/us/politics/trump-comey-showboatfbi.html; see also supra Part IV(B)(1) for discussion on the Unitary Political
Tool.
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James Comey.253 Just as President Washington requested the
opinions of his Cabinet on the Whiskey Rebellion, Trump
requested the opinions of his Cabinet on the merits of firing
Comey. Additionally, like President Washington’s use of his
principal officers’ opinions as evidence in intra-branch and interbranch decisions, Trump claimed to act on such advice in his
decision to fire Director Comey. Finally, much like the debate
between Hamilton and Randolph on whether to name and
shame the rebels, Trump and his administration ultimately
decided to release Rosenstein’s letter to give political cover for
his decision to fire Comey. Unfortunately, unlike Washington,
Trump directly contradicted this justification within 48 hours in
an interview with NBC News, stating that he had already
decided to fire Comey without Rosenstein’s opinion and
mentioning the Russia investigation as part of his thinking.254
Furthermore, President Trump has shown he is unwilling
to rely on his principal officers, instead speaking directly to the
inferior officer handling the individual matter. Early on in his
administration, President Trump established the precedent of
speaking privately with former FBI Director James Comey.
These one-on-one communications run afoul of norms
established in the justice system shortly after Watergate, norms
intended to insulate the law enforcement community from
improper influence.255 These communications also show that
President Trump does not share in President Washington’s
awareness of presidential power and its potentially corrupting
influence, as exemplified by Washington’s decision to abstain

253. See Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (1968), amended by Pub. L. No. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407 (1976); Pub. L.
No. 112-24, 125 Stat. 238 (2011). Confusingly, the authorizing statute for the
FBI Director vests the appointment power in the Attorney General and, in the
revision notes, the power is vested in the President. Either way, the statute
does not clearly state that the President cannot remove the Director without
cause, and, as discussed below, a clear statement rule likely applies to these
restrictions.
254. See Baker & Shear, supra note 252; see also supra Part V(A) for
discussion of Washington’s use of the Opinions Clause.
255. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to
Heads of Dep’t Components to All U.S. Attorneys (May 11, 2009),
https://lawfare.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/staging/2017/2009%20Eric%20
Holder%20memo.pdf.
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while the Senate debated nominees.256 To reiterate, Washington
recognized the power of the Presidency, and how the
Constitution not only allowed for but perhaps necessitated the
political branches to establish some safeguards for the proper
exercise of government.
In the post-Watergate world, this same awareness of the
potentially corrupting power of the presidency reappeared in the
relationship between the President and Department of Justice.
However, unlike Washington’s inter-branch compromise with
the Senate above, the post-Watergate Presidents have struck an
intra-branch balance with their Attorneys General to guard
against the improper political influence on the inner workings of
the DOJ. As a result, Attorneys General issued guidelines that
established walls between the White House and the inferior and
civil officers in the Department of Justice.257
Attorney General Eric Holder’s guidelines provide a useful
illustration of the balance between presidential power and
shielding against improper political influence.258 The guidelines
explicitly state that all initial communications from the White
House should be directed exclusively to either the Attorney
General or the Deputy Attorney General, and, if continued
updates on a pending investigation are required, the Attorney
General may designate a subordinate officer as the contact
person, but that subordinate must regularly inform the Attorney
General of these contacts.259 Furthermore, Holder’s guidelines
regulate the President’s requests for legal advice from the Office
of Legal Counsel, stipulating that those requests must include
the Attorney General in addition to the Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, who must inform the
General of any contacts from the White House deemed to be
improper political influences.260 Finally, Holder reiterates the
256. See supra Part III(B), notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
257. See Massimo Calabresi, The FBI Talked to the White House About
Its Russia Probe. That Was Probably Against the Rules, TIME (Feb. 25, 2017),
http://time.com/4682791/fbi-russia-reince-priebus-andrew-mccabe-justicerules/; Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the U.S.
President, to All White House Staff (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com
/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000.
258. Memorandum from Holder, supra note 255.
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id. at 3.
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purpose stated in the prior administration guidelines: “[w]hat
these procedures are intended to do is route communications to
the proper officials so they can be adequately reviewed and
considered, free from either the reality or the appearance of
improper influence.”261
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell’s 1978 address was even
more explicit on the screening role of the Attorney General.
Although Holder’s address expressly supersedes the prior
memos,262 it’s still useful to see how previous Attorneys General
have seen their role as the principal officer in charge of the DOJ.
Bell stated that it was his “job to screen these communications
to insure [sic] that any improper attempts to influence a decision
do not reach the Assistant Attorney General. Any relevant
information or legal argument will, of course, be passed on.”263
Although this is self-imposed discipline on behalf of the
executive branch, Bell and President Carter established the
restricted hierarchy allowed by the Opinions Clause by routing
all communications through the Attorney General. Bell also
played the role of a filter, intercepting and stopping
communications from the White House that he deemed
improper.264
In the initial examination of these guidelines, we see that
the DOJ and by extension, the Executive Branch as a whole,
restricted itself in a similar vein to the negative implications in
the Opinions Clause. While the Holder memo does not cite the
Opinions Clause, it clearly establishes that the President should
direct inquiries to the principal officer rather than the inferior
officers. The principal officer, in this case the Attorney General,
then assumes the responsibility of reviewing the information
requested and facilitating its communication to the White House
in the least-improper way.
Clearly, the post-Watergate
Department of Justice guidelines reflect the same concern of
improper influence that Washington shared with the First
Senate.
Although these restrictions are not imposed by
261. Id. at 4.
262. Id. (superseding the 2007 memo issued by Attorney General Michael
Mukasey).
263. Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address before Department of
Justice Lawyers 7–8 (Sept. 6, 1978) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice).
264. Id.
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congress, they reflect a self-imposed decision that the executive
power of the Vesting Clause should not include demanding
inferior officers of the DOJ report directly to the President.265
President Trump, on the other hand, ignored these
guidelines and norms with respect to two inferior Officers:266
former FBI Director James Comey and Former U.S. Attorney
Preet Bharara. Interestingly, the reactions of both individuals
highlight the shaky ground President Trump stood on when he
made these improper contacts. James Comey testified to the
Senate that he “spoke alone with President Obama twice in
person” during his tenure in the Obama administration, while
he had “nine one-on-one conversations with President Trump in
four months.”267 Comey went on to describe one of the early
meetings with President Trump – a one-on-one dinner with the
President in which Comey felt that the President wished to
“create some sort of patronage relationship.”268 This meeting
and such a patronage relationship concerned Comey “greatly,
given the FBI’s traditionally independent status in the executive
branch.”269 Already, we see Comey’s instincts reflect the postWatergate policies of a politically-independent FBI in which it
would be inappropriate for a president to have a conversation
with the Director, an inferior officer, alone.
Perhaps the most striking meeting occurred on February 14,
2017, when President Trump asked the Vice President, the
Deputy Director of the CIA, the Director of the National
Counter-Terrorism Center, Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Attorney General to clear the room so that he could speak to
Comey alone.270 Tellingly, the Attorney General lingered next
265. If imposed by Congress, such restrictions on the President’s
authority would certainly be unconstitutional under the Unitary Executive
theory. As Professors Calabresi and Prakash argued, one of the powers vested
in the President by the Vesting Clause is the power to act in the inferior
officer’s stead or to nullify any actions that officer takes. See Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 16.
266. Memorandum from McGahn, supra note 257 (which Trump
apparently violated).
267. Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/07/us/politics/
document-Comey-Prepared-Remarks-Testimony.html.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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to Comey, but Trump again instructed Sessions to leave the
room.271 Once alone, President Trump told Comey that he wants
to talk about Michael Flynn, the recently fired National Security
Advisor who has since pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI. 272
According to Comey’s testimony, Trump told him that Michael
Flynn “is a good guy and. . .I hope you can see your way clear to
letting this go, to letting Flynn go.”273 Here, we see the exact
type of communication that the post-Watergate memos sought
to limit—the President using his Office and his political
presence to influence an inferior officer in the investigation of a
political friend of the President. Under the Griffin Bell and Eric
Holder guidelines, such a communication should have been
directed to the Attorney General, who would have then refused
to pass along the request to the FBI.274
Comey’s actions after this meeting underscore his
discomfort and the questionable authority of the President to
make such an order directly to the FBI Director. Comey testified
that he shared the contents of the conversation with an
immediate team of senior leadership at the FBI, and that they
agreed that “it was important not to infect the investigative
team with the President’s request, which we did not intend to
abide.”275 There are two takeaways from this portion of the
testimony, which speak to the negative implications of the
Opinions Clause. One, Comey and his leadership team decided
to ignore the order of the President, clearly showing that the FBI
Director did not recognize the President’s authority to issue such
a directive. Thus, either Comey was disobeying his Oath of
Office to uphold the Constitution of the United States, or the
Executive Power of the Vesting Clause does not fill in the gap
left by the Opinions Clause – the top-down directive to an

271. Id.
272. Michael D. Shear & Adam Goldman, Michael Flynn Pleads Guilty to
Lying to the F.B.I. and Will Cooperate with Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/politics/michael-flynn-guiltyrussia-investigation.html.
273. Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, supra note
267.
274. Bell, supra note 263, at 7–8.
275. Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, supra note
267.
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inferior officer.276 Two, Comey and his team decided to not
inform the investigators of the President’s request, a decision
that implicitly recognizes the potential for improper political
influence on investigative matters.277
Comey also communicated his discomfort with the private
conversation to Attorney General Sessions, illustrating his belief
in the hierarchy set up by the DOJ guidelines. After the Flynn
conversation, Comey
Took the opportunity to implore the Attorney
General to prevent any future direct
communication between the President and [him].
[He] told the AG that what had just happened—
him being asked to leave while the FBI Director,
who reports to the AG, remained behind—was
inappropriate and should never happen.278
In other words, Comey understood that he, as an inferior
officer, reported to the principal officer—Attorney General
Sessions—and not directly to the President.
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara shared Comey’s concerns over
the President’s authority to communicate directly with him, a
fellow inferior officer.279 Interestingly, Bharara reports that
while initial conversations after the election were
uncomfortable, he answered the President-elect’s phone calls
because “he was not the President.”280 However, when President
Trump called him again on March 9, 2017, Bharara did not
276. This is not to say that Director Comey and his team believed the
President lacked the constitutional authority to make such an order under the
Vesting Clause or based on a belief on the Opinions Clause. Rather, it is
intended to show that his actions fit with this article’s reading of both the
Opinions Clause and the Vesting Clause.
277. This recognition of the power of the Presidency to infect otherwise
independent decision making is the same recognition that drove President
Washington’s absence from the First Senate’s deliberations.
278. Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks for Testimony, supra note
267 (emphasis added).
279. Matthew Haag, Preet Bharara Says Trump Tried to Build
Relationship with Him Before Firing, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/politics/preet-bharara-trump
contacts.html (calling Comey’s testimony “deja vu”).
280. Id.
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return the phone call and instead reported the contact to the
Attorney General.281 Bharara’s juxtaposition of his willingness
to speak with citizen Trump with his unwillingness to speak
with President Trump demonstrates his belief in the hierarchy
established by the DOJ guidelines, a hierarchy that also fits with
this article’s reading of the Opinions Clause.282
Comey and Bharara quite clearly echo the concerns
grounded in the DOJ guidelines in the post-Watergate world. To
them, the President’s attempt to influence inferior officers and
their decisions on individual investigations was an
inappropriate and overreaching exercise of executive power.
Rod Rosenstein apparently agrees, appointing Special Counsel
Robert Mueller to investigate the President’s actions
surrounding Comey’s firing.283 While Special Counsel Mueller’s
investigation continues, some scholars have argued that
President Trump’s constitutional authority immunizes him from
prosecution or impeachment for this conduct.284 Others have
argued that legislation protecting Robert Mueller from
President
Trump’s
removal
authority
would
be
unconstitutional.285 To some degree, both of these arguments
rest on the modern unitary executive theory, namely that the
Vesting Clause provides the President with an absolute power
to fire or direct any officer within the executive branch. The next
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference
with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, Order No. 3915-207
(2017) (“Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed
by then-FBI Director James B. Comey”).
284. See Anna Giaritelli, Alan Dershowitz: ‘You Cannot Charge a
President with Obstruction of Justice for Exercising His Constitutional Power,’
WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:14 AM), https://www.washington
examiner.com/alan-dershowitz-you-cannot-charge-a-president-withobstruction-of-justice-for-exercising-his-constitutional-power (arguing that the
President exercised his constitutional authority to fire Comey and to tell the
DOJ who to investigate, and thus cannot be prosecuted).
285. Neal K. Katyal & Kenneth W. Starr, Opinion, A Better Way to Protect
Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/
opinion/protect-mueller-russia-prosecutor.html (“The Constitution vests the
President with the power over prosecutors, and it is hard to imagine courts
permitting Congress to place serious restrictions on that power”). Instead,
Katyal and Starr argue for a “Bork regulation,” in which the Attorney General
issues a regulation stating that the President will only be able to fire the
Special Counsel with Congress’ consent. Id.
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section explains why both of these arguments are wrong and
what congress can do to better guard against this form of
presidential overreach.
B. Congress Can Protect Against Presidential Overreach
in the FBI
The constitutional interpretation of both the Opinions
Clause and Article II outlined in this article enables the congress
to guard against the improper exercise of presidential power. To
do so, congress can pass the DOJ guidelines discussed in Part A
into law, insulating investigative officials from the political
pressures of the White House. Although congress does not gain
any authority from Article II, it can pass such restrictions under
the Necessary and Proper Clause. As established in removal
cases such as Buckley v. Valeo, congress has the power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to shield executive agencies from
improper political influence.286 Here, it is necessary and proper
for Congress to insulate the Department of Justice to provide for
the independent and non-corrupt execution of the laws—laws
Congress clearly has the Article I Section 8 power to enact.
Then, Article II, through the three negative implications of the
Opinions Clause, allows for these protections. To reiterate, the
Opinions Clause and the other power clauses within Article II
Section Two mean that the president does not have an absolute
power to take any action that is not expressly included. As
outlined above, all other actions can be regulated. As a result,
the Opinions Clause, by its limitations, means that the president
does not have an absolute power to require inferior officers
report directly to him, to remove at-will all officers, or to direct
officers to take specific actions.287
Thus, congress can regulate the president’s interactions
with the inferior officers within the Department of Justice.288 In
286. See Steele & Bowman, supra note 76.
287. See supra Part III(B).
288. See Barry H. Berke, Noah Bookbinder, & Norman L. Eisen,
Presidential Obstruction of Justice: The Case of Donald J. Trump BROOKINGS
(2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/presidentialobstruction-of-justice-the-case-of-donald-j-trump-final.pdf.
Quite possibly,
Congress has already regulated these interactions with the obstruction of
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other words, congress could pass a statute codifying the
regulatory guidelines issued by the post-Watergate Attorneys
General, requiring that White House communications go
through the Attorney General and not directly to the inferior
officer in charge of the investigation. Of course, the Opinions
Clause prevents congress from completely insulating the
Department of Justice or insulating any particular matter from
the president’s review. The Clause gives the president the power
to inquire about any subject within the particular executive
department, thus giving the president an express textual power
to inquire about any matters within the DOJ, so long as he
communicates through the Attorney General.289 Nevertheless,
such a law would avoid the political pressures on the FBI
Director or the U.S. Attorney, facilitating greater independence
in the justice system.290
Congress can also pass a statute insulating the Special
Counsel or the FBI Director from removal at the pleasure of the
president. Again, because the Opinions Clause is a limited
textual grant, the president cannot claim based on the text of the
Constitution an absolute power to fire any officer within the
executive branch. Of course, as outlined above, the president
could use the Opinions Clause to find such cause for removal.
For instance, President Trump likely could have gone to the
Senate or to a court and submitted Rod Rosenstein’s memo as
evidence for cause to remove FBI Director Comey, but that
process would have had the added potential of detecting the true
reason behind the firing.
Finally, congress could pass a law restricting the president’s
authority to order or stop investigations into specific individuals.
The Opinions Clause, by empowering the president with the
absolute power only to require reports from the officers, does not
expressly vest the power to issue orders to those officers.
Therefore, in order to avoid politically motivated prosecutions
and investigations, congress could deny the president the
authority to order the FBI to investigate or not investigate a
specific individual. Such a law avoids any future scenes like the
justice statutes.
289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
290. See Haag, supra note 279; Read James Comey’s Prepared Remarks
for Testimony, supra note 267.
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one Director Comey described in the Oval Office, in which
President Trump essentially instructed him to drop the Michael
Flynn investigation.291
VII. Conclusion
Professor Amar’s statement that the Opinions Clause and
its implications are “both timely and timeless” is as true today
as ever.292 By analyzing the text and context of the clause, we
gain a greater sense of the executive power the framers
designed, and, more importantly, a greater sense of what they
left to us. President Washington knew the power of information
within the executive branch, and we saw him use it to his and
the nation’s advantage in ending the Whiskey Rebellion. On the
other hand, the Opinions Clause and its implications answer the
questions raised about some of President Trump’s actions. We
need not concede this fight when scholars cloak presidential
overreach in an ambiguous and vast reservoir of executive
power. Instead, we can look to the Opinions Clause, the
Constitution’s only textual power grant for the president over
the day-to-day administration of the federal government. We
can understand its energy and vigor for a president seeking to
further political goals. Nevertheless, perhaps most timely, we
recognize its flexibility, and the safeguards it and the framers
allowed us to design.

291. Id.
292. Amar, supra note 10, at 647.
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